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I.

INTRODUCTION

Joe Amicable resides in the City ofTalks, where Lisa
Low-Pride manages the federally insured Talks
Commercial Bank. Joe is a well-liked, wealthy
businessman, who, in addition to contributing enormously
to the Talks economy, has always been a law-abiding
citizen, doing all of his businesses "by the books." Joe is
a charismatic individual whose smooth-talking ability always
got him whatever he asked for. Some time ago, he met
with Lisa Low-Pride to go over his application for a
business loan. He knew that Ms. Low-Pride loved the
pretentious side oflife. He decided, therefore, to aid his
otherwise impeccable application by being overly polite
to her. He told her that she was the second (to Mrs.
Amicable, that is) most beautiful and attractive woman in
Talks.
Intending to influence Ms. Low-Pride's disposition
towards the loan application, Joe disregarded the fact that
three months prior to the meeting he had voted Ms. LowPride as the least attractive woman among twenty-five
contestants in Talks's annual beauty contest. He thought,
however, that by now she had forgotten the beauty contest.
He was mistaken. He also did not know about the federal
statute that made it a crime for "anyone to knowingly make
anyfalse statement for the purpose of influencing in any
way the action of an FDIC-insured bank upon any
application for business loan." Additionally, Joe did not
know that this offense attracted a mandatory five-year
incarceration at the federal penitentiary, and a lifetime ban
from loan applications. Ms. Low-Pride contacted the
appropriate federal authorities. Joe was subsequently
convicted, and has appealed to your court. As a judge,
would you, under the circumstances, affirm his conviction
and send him to prison (or ban him from seeking loans
from banks)? Or would you excuse such flattery as not
relevant to a loan application? Your choice, indeed,
depends on how you interpret the statute in question.
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Would you interpret it to prohibit such an irrelevant false
statement?
If you were Justice Keen of the Supreme Court of
Newgarth in Lon Fuller's illustrative case ofthe Speluncean
Explorers, you would abide by the statute's text and send
Joe to prison for five years. I As with the Speluncean
explorers, the language of the statute in Joe's case appears
plain and unambiguous. Joe's situation seems to be
covered by the statute. There is also no doubt that Joe's
flattery of the bank manager is a false statement,2 or that
Joe intended to influence the consideration of his loan
application. Similar to the Speluncean explorers, Joe must

I See Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62
HARv. L. REv. 616 (1949): In the case ofthe Speluncean explorers,
Roger Whetmore, with his fellow members of the Speluncean
Society (an organization interested in cave-exploration), went on
an expedition. As they explored a certain cave, the cave's entrance
gave way and closed them in; they were trapped. They tried
diligently to escape, but were unsuccessful. It became eventually
apparent that they were to stay in the cave for far longer than
they had bargained. Although a rescue team was sent after therp,
the team failed to get them out on time. They spent 32 days in the
cave. To avoid starving to death during those days, they killed
and ate Roger Whetmore, who initially suggested that they resort
to such survival tactics. Upon their rescue, they were charged
with murder, and subsequently convicted and sentenced to hang.
An appeal reached the highest court of the land, on which sat
Justices Keen, Tatting, Foster, Handy, and Chief Justice
Truepenny. The issue was the interpretation of the criminal statute,
which read: "Whoever shall willfully take the life of another shall
be punished by death." Should the Court affirm the explorers'
death sentences? Ch ief Justice Truepenny affirmed, but
admonished the governor to commute the sentences, since the
statute applied unfairly to this excusable situation. Justice Keen
would simply affirm, without any consideration of the excuses,
since the statutory text was plain. Justice Foster considered the
statute's purpose and other extratextual factors, and voted for
reversal. Justice Tatting chided Justice Foster for not limiting his
decision to the text, but nevertheless abstained from deciding,
because he found no way out of his dilemma. Justice Handy
dwelt on public opinion, and voted for reversal. Because the
votes were evenly divided the explorers' sentences were affirmed.
This hypothetical naration by Professor Fuller is a classic
illustration of the arguments surrounding the theories of statutory
construction.

22. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 692 (3d ed. 1990) (defining flattery as excessive,
insincere or false praises that are often used to win favors).

face the five-year mandate ofthe federal statute. 3 But, is
this the right result? Does the statute actually cover all
false statements, including those not material to the loan
application? Is Joe's flattering statement equally a false
statement as, say, ifhe had lied to the loan officer about
owning a beach-front property in Ocean City, Maryland?
What if, with a view to winning more favors, he had falsely
bragged to her at a cocktail party that he had uncovered
the recipe for Coke? Must he be punished because she
happens to be the loan officer who is reviewing his loan
application? Is it not an understatement to say that such
irrelevant false statements, although juvenile, are not within
the coverage of the statute in question? Yet the language
of the statute prohibits all false statements. Indeed, this is
precisely the debate driving the current controversy in
statutory construction, especially in the United States
Supreme Court.
Like Justice Foster of Newgarth, Justice Stevens
would reverse Joe's conviction. To Justice Stevens, such
a federal statute does not cover all false statements; it
covers only statements that are material to the loan
application. Thus, the government must 'prove the
materiality of falsehood as a separate element of the crime
of making a punishable false statement. In contrast, Justice
Souter, like Justice Keen of Newgarth, would find that
the federal statute plainly does not require any proof of
materiality as a separate element ofthe crime.
In United States v. Wells,4 the issue before the
Supreme Court was the construction of § 1014 of the
United States Code. 5 In contest was whether the federal
Joe's situation is sharply different from that of the Speluncean
explorers. I would not have reversed the explorers' sentences,
because their act was not only atrocious, but also met any
definition of murder one relies on.

3

4

117 S. Ct. 921 (1997).

See id. at 924. In Wells, the defendants were owners ofa business
venture, which leased office copiers for a monthly fee that covered
the use and maintenance of such copiers. See id. In an attempt to
raise money, they assigned their financial interests in various
lease agreements to certain banks. See id. As' part of the
contracting process with the banks, they furnished the banks
with false information. See id. First, they gave the banks versions
of the lease agreements that falsely indicated that the monthly
leasing fees they charged their customers did not include the
5

30.2 U. Bait. L.F. 5
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statute required the Government to prove separately that
the "false statement" charged under the statute concerned
a fact of consequence to a loan application. 6 The statute's
language was similar to that quoted in Joe's situation. 7 Both
the trial court and the intermediate court construed it as
requiring a culpable false statement to relate to a material
fact. 8 The Supreme Court rejected that construction. 9
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, looked primarily
to the text of the statute. 10 The text, according to him,

copiers' maintenance costs, but that the customers were
separately responsible for such costs. See id. According to the
government, had the banks known that the defendants already
charged their customers for maintenance and were responsible
for servicing the copiers, the banks might have required the
defendants to maintain a cash-flow reserve account. See id. In
addition to this misrepresentation, the defendants forged their
wives' signatures in the personal guaranties to the banks. See
id. They were subsequently convicted for knowingly making a
false statement to federally-insured banks. See id.
6

See id.

7

See 18 U.S.c. § 1014 (1976):
Whoever knowingly makes any false statement or
report, or willfully overvalues any land, property or
security, for the purpose of influencing in any way the
action of the Farm Credit Administration, Federal Crop
Insurance Corporation or a company the Corporation
reinsures, the Secretary of Agriculture acting through
the Farmers Home Administration or successor agency,
the Rural Development Administration or successor
agency, any Farm Credit Bank, production credit
association, agricultural credit association, bank for
cooperatives, or any division, officer, or employee
thereof, or of any regional agricultural credit corporation
established pursuant to law, or a Federal land bank, a
Federal land bank association, a Federal Reserve bank,
a small business investment company, a Federal credit
union, an insured State-chartered credit union, any
institution the accounts of which are insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ... shall be fined
not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than
30 years, or both.

was plain and unambiguous, and proscribed "any" false
statement that satisfied the other elements of the statute. II
This is especially so, Justice Souter noted, as "[n]owhere
does [the statute] further say that a material fact must be
the subject of the false statement or so much as mention
materiality."12
The majority's interpretation of the statute in Wells
exposes the need for a closer look at the principles of
statutory construction. While the holding in Wells may be
correct in that circumstance, the Court's reading of the
statute lacks judicial prudence. Although it is hard to argue
that the defendants in Wells were not culpable, even with
materiality as an element of the offense, the problem is the
Court's approach to the statutory issue. Because the Court
paid more attention to the statute's text than its overall
substance and practicality, 13 Wells reasoning is flawed.
More specifically, it shows why jurisprudential wisdom in
statutory construction must go beyond the passive
decipherment oflegislative grammar.
In contrast to the majority's construction ofthe statute
in Wells, Justice Stevens presented a similar hypothetical
to Joe's situation above to show the fallacy of a hardnosed adherence to statutory text. 14 The issue is whether
courts and legal practitioners ought to pay more attention
to jurisprudential absurdity as a symptom of statutory
ambiguity. This Article projects that viewpoint - the socalled "golden rule" of statutory construction. Without
such an approach, a flattery-mongering loan applicant as
hypothetical Joe faces a five-year prison term. But, as
Justice Stevens correctly observed in his dissenting opinion
in Wells, ''the 'unusual' nature oftrivial statements provides
scant justification for reaching the conclusion that Congress
intended such peccadillos to constitute a felony. "15

II

See id.

121d. at 927. Although Justice Souter also reviewed the statute's
history, his interpretation was driven by the text.

8

See Wells, 117 S. Ct. at 924-25.

13 Even the Court's discussion of the statute's legislative history,
see id. at 928, is an inadequate attempt at justifying its
oversimplification ofthe statutory text.

9

See id. at 925.

14

10

See id. at 926-27.
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151d. at 938 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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This debate between the Wells majority and Justice
Stevens illustrates the main controversy in statutory
construction. While some argue that courts should limit
the consideration of a statute to the statute's text, 16 others
advocate the employment of such sources as the statute; s
legislative history, purpose, and structure. 17 The Supreme
Court itself has not been especially consistent in its
approach.ls This inconsistency buttresses the point that
statutory construction is a judicial art, and courts may find
it useful to vary their approaches according to the individual
circumstances. An adherence to a one-sided approach,
therefore, is an uncritical, if not a myopic, exercise.
This Article rejects as incomplete an exercise in
construction that relies unwisely on a statute's text. As
illustrated with hypothetical Joe above, and also developed
below, this author disagrees with the view that textual
plainness is the only barometer for measuring textual
ambiguity. To be unambiguous, a statute must be capable
of a judicious, intelligible, and not an absurd application.
This Article, however, also rejects, as an unnecessary

16 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw as a Law ofRules, 56
U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989) [hereinafter, Scalia, Rules]; Frank H.
Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983)
[hereinafter, Easterbrook, Domains].

17 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS &
REFORMS 286 (1985); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV.
321 (1990).

18 See, e.g., Estate of Covert v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469
(1992) (relying on the text of the Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, 33 U.s.C. § 933(g), to hold that the injured
employee of an oil company forfeited his rights to benefits under
that section when he failed to obtain the written approval of his
employer and the employer's insurer before settling his action
against a third-party tortfeasor); Gade v. National Solid Wastes
Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992) (relying on the structure
of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655, to
hold that the Act preempted a similar Illinois Act, noting, at 99,
that "[t]he design of the statute persuades us that Congress
intended to subject employers and employees to only one set of
regulations .... "); Wisconsin Public Intervenorv. Mortier, 501
U.S. 597 (1991) (examining the legislative history of the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U .S.C. § 136 et
seq., in ruling that the Act did not preempt the local government's
regulation of pesticide use).

usurpation oflegislative authority, the unbounded resort
to legislative history, especially where a statute's meaning
is starkly apparent from the text.
The author views statutory construction as a
comprehensive act, which requires courts. and legal
practitioners to employ a combination of those
interpretative tools that can render a statute judiciously
intelligible. Part II of this article provides necessary
background materials with which to understand this
argument. Part III examines the common approaches to
statutory construction. Part IV presents a case-note
example of the Supreme Court's "passive" approach to
construction, with a specific critique of Justice Scalia's
textualism. Part V discusses a better approach to
interpretation, using the Court of Appeals of Maryland as
an example.

II. BACKGROUND
A. The Case-Law Syndrome
With the dominance of the case-law method in lawschool instruction,19 it is easy for law graduates to
underestimate the ubiquity of statutory analysis in legal
practice. The case-law method, which is epitomized by
the Socratic method, thrives on the premise that students
are better taught to think like lawyers by learning how
older lawyers and judges have thought before them.20 This
Socratic journey begins usually in the first week oflaw
school, when students are taught the valuable lesson of
case-briefing. To succeed in this endeavor, the student
must learn to dissect a judicial opinion - to understand
who sued whom, who did what to whom, who has what

See Janeen Kerper, Creative Problem Solving vs. The Case
Method: A Marvelous Adventure In Which Winnie-The -Pooh
Meets Mrs. PalsgraJ, 34 CAL. W.L. REV. 351 (1998); see also W.
Burlette Carter, Reconstructing Langdell, 32 GA. L. REV. I (I 997).
19

See Steven I. Friedland, How We Teach: A Survey of Teaching
Techniques in American Law Schools, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 1,20
(1996). In a survey by Professor Friedland, 46% of sampled law
professors said their aim in teaching first-year students was for
the students to improve their thinking ability, compared to 15%
who said they wanted the students to learn substantive legal
doctrine, and 31 % who aimed at both objectives. See id.

20

30.2 U. Bait. L.F. 7
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rights, and, most important, what the court said about the
whole situation. The idea, as engineered by Professor
Langdell at Harvard in the 1870s, is that by perusing
appellate opinions the student would develop a critical flair
for analyzing subsequent legal problems.21 At the University
ofBaltimore, for instance, this lesson begins in orientation
week with the famous Thomas v. Winchester. 22
For those who briefed Thomas as a first law-school
exercise, little doubt exists that such was a mind-boggling
experience. Most laborious was the attempt to demystifY
the court's unorganized use of nineteenth-century legalese.
Because the opinion is so poorly written, however, it makes
an excellent apparatus for introducing new students to the
case-law method ofinstruction. The students are expected
not only to disentangle the factual intricacies of the case,
but also to follow the court's muddy analysis. Attheweek's
end, the amiable Professor Easton hopes to have oriented
the students enough for what would permeate their firstyear substantive courses - case analysis. As to those
students who came to law school to leam "the law," they
must develop a new respect for judicial opinions, and
overwrite the impression that law is couched in black and
white. They must learn, instead, to use the judge's
oftentimes-flowelY language as a blueprint for what may
seem like a legal chess game. In Torts, for example, the
students must be able to discern the assumption-of-risk

theory from Judge Cardozo's colorful articulation in
Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement CO.23
From the language in Murphy, the Torts student must
be able to argue, for instance, that the weak-at-heart who
seeks amusement in a House o/Horror assumes the risk
of a heart attack. Or that one who goes on a bumper ride
may not later claim damages for injuries from another
participant's bmnp. With a little creativity, and a proficiency
in case-synthesis, the first-year law student becomes a
learned analogist. This is the case-law method, whether
standing alone or supplemented by the problem-method;24
law students are taught through casebooks. Withjudicial
opinions like Judge Cardozo's, Judge Hand's, or Judge
Friendly's, such an education is intriguing, even though
challenging. There are two main drawbacks, however.
First, because the case-law method depends on appellate
opinions, which present cases already developed and
refined by lawyers and judges, it limits the extent to which
students develop their originality. 25 Second, and more
23 250 NY. 479 {I 929):

Valenti non fit injuria. One who takes part in such a
sport accepts the dangers that inhere in it so far as they
are obvious and necessary, just as a fencer accepts the
risk of a thrust by his antagonist or a spectator at the
ball game the chance of contact with the ball. . .. The
antics of the clown are not the paces of the cloistered
cleric. The rough and boisterous joke, the horseplay of
the crowd, evokes its own guffaws, but they are not the
pleasures of tranquillity. The plaintiff was not seeking a
retreat for meditation. Visitors were tumbling about the
belt to the merriment of onlookers when he made his
choice to join them. He took the chance of a like fate,

See Russell L. Weaver, Langdell's Legacy: Living With The
Case Method, 36 VILL. L. REv. 517, 549-52 (1991).

21

226 N.Y. 397(1852): Mr. Thomas, the husband of an ill wom'!n
purchased a medicinal extract, believing it to be what the label
portrayed. But the manufacturer's employee mislabeled the bottle;
the bottle actually contained a poisonous liquid. Mrs. Thomas
drank the liquid and suffered physiological and psychological
injuries. Unfortunately for the Thomases, Mr. Thomas did not
buy the drug directly ITom the manufacturer, and New York law at
the time required privity of contract for a suit to succeed against
a manufacturer. With the case, however, the court changed the
law. Winchester had to compensate Mrs. Thomas because the
item sold was of a dangerous nature, and posed an imminent
danger to unsuspecting customers, who also were more likely to
consume the item than was the vendor who bought directly ITom
Winchester. Thus, the genesis of New York's product liability
law ignited.

30.2 U. BaIt L.F. 8

with whatever damage to his body might ensue from
such afall. The timorous may stay at home.

Id. at 482-83 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The plaintiffin
Murphy fractured his kneecap when he was thrown backward by
"the Flopper," a ride offered by the defendant to the public in its
amusement park. The fun in riding "the Flopper" came from its
jerky movement, the riders falling on one another, the screams
and laughter. The plaintiff knew that he could fall, yet he got on
the ride. See id. at 480-81.

See Cynthia G. Hawkins-Leon, The Socratic Method-Problem
Method Dichotomy: The Debate Over Teaching Methods
Continues, 1998 B.v.u. Eouc. & L.J. 1 (1998).

24

25

See Weaver, supra note 21, at 591.
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relevant to the discussion here, the case-law method
relegates statutory law to the background, and distorts
students' ideas about actual legal practice. Because
students become comfortable with approaching legal
problems in a casebook fashion, they find it increasingly
hard to develop an appreciation for statutory law. 26
This mediocre attitude towards statutory law is more
so fortified by the absence of courses in statutory
construction from law school curriculumY Because law
schools generally have not stressed the primacy of statutes
in their curricula, emphasizing instead the ratio decedendi
ofjudicial opinions,28 few students ever get to know or
master statutory construction in their law school careers.29
Even where, as might be the case today, many law schools
offer courses on legislation,30 these courses are not included
in the required curricula. 31 Some schools treat statutory
construction only in the context of those substantive
courses that derive primarily from codified law (tax
courses, for example), noping that interpretative skills
would "rob off' on students. 32 This approach - called

"the pervasive method"33 - is, however, faulty because it
attends primarily to substantive issues, not to the legislative
process or interpretative principles. 34 As Judge Posner
noted, a law pro fessor' s expertise in a particular statute is
not a substitute for the systematic knowledge required for
teaching legislation. 35 What is ironic about this gap in law
school instruction is that most legal disputes today are likely
to concern legislative enactment - statutes, regulations, or
ordinances. 36 In fact, it would not be farfetched to say
that more than fifty percent of cases decided annually by
the United States Supreme Court involve statutory
interpretation. 37 The story is not too different in state
courts. For instance, about half of the eighty cases decided
between September 15, 1995 and May 17,'1996 by the
Court of Appeals of Maryland required the court to
interpret a constitutional or statutory provision. 38 Yet most
lawyers, and even trial judges, are not properly attentive
to interpretation issues. 39

26 See Paul T. Wangerin, Skills Training in "Legal Analysis: " A
Systematic Approach, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 409, 438 (1986).

27 See HOWARD ABADINSKY, LAW AND JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE AMERlACN LEGAL SYSTEM 89-112 (3d. 1995).

28

See id.

See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation - In the
Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800 (1983);
see also Otto J. Hetzel, Instilling Legislative Interpretation Skills
in the Classroom and the Courtroom, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 663 (1987)
29

(arguing that "[r]everence for tradition in law and for our common
law roots seems to have exercised a deadhand control in this
area, restraining any increase in emphasis in legal education on
the study of legislation and its interpretation").

See Robert J. Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canon and
Grand Theories: A Neo-Realist View of Statutory Construction,
62 OEO. WASH. L. REv. 1,5 (1993).

30

See Hetzel, supra note 29, at 664. The University of Baltimore,
for example, offers the course Legislation as an upper-level
elective course, not as part of its intense and well-respected legal
skills program.

31

32

See id.

33

See id.

34

See id.

See Posner, supra note 29, at 80 I; see also William N. Eskridge,
Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship amd Pedagogy
in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 691, 691-92
(1'987) (noting that, although substantive courses "can teach
students a great deal about working with statutes, ... they do not
approach statutes as a systematic topic of inquiry and do not
teach general skills of dealing with legislatures and their statutory
products").
35

36

See Hetzel, supra note 29, at 664.

Ofthe 99 Supreme Court cases sampled by this author from the
period between April, 1999 and April, 2000, 51 addressed some
form of statutory construction issue.
37

See Annual Review of Maryland Law: Court of Appeals of
Maryland, 1995-96 Opinions, 26 U. BALT. L. REv. 1 (1996).

38

39

See Hetzel, supra note 29, at 664.

30.2 U. Bait. L.F. 9
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B. What is Statutory Construction?
Statutory construction, according to Professor
Eskridge, is "the Cinderella oflegal scholarship."40 For
years, it received little, if any, academic attention, despite
its first significant root in Aristotlean writings.41 But,
because civil obligations have derived much from the
existence of codified provisions, statutory construction is
at least as old as the quest to understand such obligations.42
As Professor Eskridge further observed, the general
applicability of statutory directives has historically
depended on how practical such directives are to
individuals. 43 Even as far back as the Code ofHummurabi
in ancient Babylonia, and the Justinian Code oflater Roman
Empire, law's legitimacy flowed from how amenable its
contents were to interpretation. 44 The interpreter's job,
far from being passive and abstract, was an involved and
a contextual endeavor, which gave an interpreter the
incidental power to dictate the direction of a statutory
command.
In today's society, the judge is that celebrated
interpreter, mainly by virtue of a constitutional duty.
Statutory construction, therefore, is the judicial attempt to
give meaning to a statute, so as to decide whether and
how the statute applies to a particular action. This quest
for meaning is usually an artistic function,45 whose
complexity depends on how ambiguous the statutory
language is, and on the angle from which the judge tackles
such ambiguity. Even with its various approaches, however,
modem statutory interpretation developed from ancient
legal hermeneutics, which emphasized a dynamic

40 WILLIAM

N.

ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION. 1

(1994).
41

See id. at 1-3.

42

See id. at I.

43

See id.

44

See id. at 2.

See generally Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading
a/Statutes, 47 COL. L. REV. 527 (1947).

relationship between the interpreter and the author. 46
Therefore, the judge's approach to statutory construction
must express a judicious connection between a statute's
enactment and its application and effects - it must be the
judicial placenta between the legislative conception and
the constitutional life of a statute.
Although legislative pronouncements have increased
in modem times, and despite the distinguished intellectual
history of statutory interpretation, American scholars did
not become terribly attentive to this area of legal
development until the early 1980s.47 Even then, there was
no attempt to formulate a coherent system of interpretation
that translated into a unique legal discipline. 48 Statutory
construction, unsettled and unbranded, has been a judicial
"Hail-Mary," with a case-by-case hope that a particular
judge would be blessed with the wisdom of biblical

See Eskridge, supra note 40, at 4: Long before legal
hermeneutics, however, Aristotle had, in his Rhetoric and
Nicomachean Ethics, formulated his principles of statutory
interpretation based on the concept of practical wisdom. In his
view, statutory texts were not cast in stones, but were to be
interpreted according to individual circumstances. This
Chameleonic approach was to be followed later by the writers of
the accompanying Digest to the Roman Justinian Code, who,
although advocated a more directed approach, saw statutory
interpretation also as a flexible endeavor. Building on Aristotle's
Rhetoric and the Justinian Digest, the legal hermeneuticists of
the Enlightement age, from whom modem theories developed,
offered an approach that objectified the intent of the statutory
author. To this end, one interpreting a statutory language was to
assume the author's position, imaginatively reconstructing the
circumstances surrounding the statute's creation, and interpreting
the statute according to how those circumstances were
understood. Modem hermeneuticists, such as legal process
theorists, recognize, however, the problem with imaginative
construction. As such, they offer statutory interpretation as a
system under which the judge must give a statute such reading
as is in line with the statute's purpose, paying particular attention
to how the present situation has changed from one existing when
the statute was written. As developed more in Part III of this
article, many theories have resulted since then. See id. at 2-5.

46

47

See id. at 1-2.

48

See id.

45
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Solomon. 49 Even with the presently heightened interest
by scholars, and the resultant enrichment of the judge's
toolbox, current efforts have not necessarily amounted to
a settled legal discipline. 50 To understand this intellectual
lag, and thereby control the case-law syndrome, one must
first understand the nature ofcodified law, especially with
regards to the development of the American legal system.

C. The American Codes of Statutes
In simplistic terms, a statute can be defined as "a
command of a particular legislature (federal, state,
municipal) that must be obeyed, under threat of
governmental sanction, by those whose behavior it
regulates. "5 I In more descriptive terms:
[O]n their face, statutes appear abstract. They
reveal no story, no characters, no drama usually just a dry recitation of rights and
obligations. Sometimes their provisions conflict
or are unclear or vague. But ... statutes never

represent the abstract exercise of power.
They are always the legislative response to
problems identified by legislative bodies as
needing resolution in a particular fashion. Every
statute has a story behind it, although (unlike a
judicial decision) its story is usually untold in
the statutory language. Often the story is quite
dramatic. Second, statutes are almost always
the products of compromise. 52

The approach employed is akin to the last-minute attempt by a
losing quarterback in a football game to salvage the game by
throwing the ball to the end-zone, without regards to the relative
positions ofthe players, hoping that one of his teammates would
catch the ball and score a touchdown - what is commonly referred
to as a "Hail-Mary" pass.
49

50

See supra note 46 and accompanying text.

To the extent that statutes direct more than they
describe, they are skeletal in nature. Even though they
could not exist without the "why" of the story they present,
they recite only the "who," "what," and sometimes the
"how," but seldom express the "why." They are the
legislative expression of present public policy, which may
not exist long enough to govern future conducts. 53 Because
statutes are the problem-responding announcements of
individual policy goals, they differ from case law in the
latter's foundation on a fact-specific, two-party dispute.
Statutes have been a part ofthe American legal and political
system for ages. What is relatively foreign to the American
polity, however, is the concept ofcodified law. American
law, like its English antecedent, was not cast in a mosaic
stone, but was a philosophical product of tentative
legislation and judicial experimentation. As it epitomized
the Crown's legitimacy, and also represented an
ecclesiastical attempt at equity, the English common law
had to be fact-restrained. 54 The law was "commonly"
formulated by judges, who ironically were not "common
men," but mainly royal intelligentsia with lukewarm
attitudes toward codes. 55 The American law followed
this disposition.
Codes, during the formative years of the United
States, were unique to civil law regimes, such as the French
and German systems. 56 While the French and German
political environments were ripe for codified law, the
American experience counseled a reliance on the English
common-law system. The French Code Napoleon, for
example, resulted from the French revolution against the
I 'ancien regime. 57 Moreover, pre-revolution French law

See Randall B. Ripley, Stages o/the Policy Process, in PUBLIC
POLICY THEORIES, MODELS, AND CONCEPTS: AN ANTHOLOGY 157, 158161 (Daniel C. McCool ed., 1995).

53

54

See generally LEWIS MAYERS, THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 338-

366 (rev. ed. 1964).
55

See id.

ABNER 1. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 2 ( 1997) .

56 See CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT:
A STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM 71 (1981).

52Id at I (emphasis added).

57

51

See id. at 3.
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actually drew from various Roman codes. 58 The American
legal revolution, in contrast, did not disband the commonlaw system. 59 American patriots, unlike the French, were
not dissatisfied with the law as it existed in colonial times. 60
They were aggrieved, instead, by the Crown's obstruction
of justice as in the subj ugation of the judge's
independence. 61 They sought, therefore, to discontinue
the whimsical application ofthe existing law, not to replace
the law with civil codes. 62
The American codification movement, as a result,
was not ignited until the nineteenth century when Jeremy
Bentham passionately advocated for importing the
European civil codes.63 This movement derived essentially
from the democratic exigency in making the law more
accessible to those it sought to control. 64 Before then, the
country had consistently rebuffed various calls to enshrine
a code system. 65 Even Bentham's two letters to President
Madison in 1811 did not persuade the President to
commission a federal codification taskforce. 66 But, as it

58

See id. at 71.

59

See id. at 3.

60

See id. at 4.

61

See id.

62

See id.

63

See id.

See id. at 69-92. The greater part ofthe problem comes from the
law being scattered in various locations. There was, of course,
no organized system of legal publication, as in today's official
and national reporter systems. Even congressional acts were
mostly in leaflets, and it was a cherished privilege to own copies.
See generally id.

became increasingly difficult for the average citizen to know
what the legal obligations were, attitudes towards
codification began to change. 67 The potential for political
instability corning from the lawlessness that could result
from the inaccessibility and uncertainty ofthe law prompted
the nineteenth-century surge to codify the law. 68
The above is important in discussing how the u.s.
law, even in today's codified fomlat, differs fundamentally
from European codes. Any viable system of statutory
construction must be informed by these historical
differences. To appreciate also why American codes
require a different interpretative approach from European
codes, it is paramount to acquaint oneself with the
fundamental distinction between codes and statutes, and
with how one code system differs from another. The
common-law lawyer may find it hard to grasp this
distinction, especially as codes and statutes are used
interchangeably. But, while a statute is the actual law, a
code is the form in which the law exists. A code is the
systemic communication of the law - the evidence ofthe
law. It is different from statutes in that statutes are mere
legislative proclamations by the legislature. In the case of
the U.S. federal statute, for example, they are usually the
acts of Congress signed by the President. Because
American codes began as a way of putting the average
citizen on notice,69 they are not codes in the actual
philosophical sense. They are codes of publication
convenience - they are not "substantive," but "formal,"
codes. 70
A fonnal code does not begin with the original attempt
at philosophically formulating a coherent body oflaw. 71

64

65

L. REV. 359 (1995); Lewis Grossman, Codification and the
California Mentality, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 617 (1994).
67

See Cook, supra note 56, at 12-18.

68

See id.

69

See id.

See id.

See Sanford H. Kadish, Codifiers of the Criminal Law:
Wechsler's Predecessors, 78 COL. L. REV. 1098, 1099 (1978).
Bentham's argument fared better with such states as Louisiana,
the Dakota territory, California, Georgia, New York, Montana and
Alabama, although not equally. See id.; see also Andrew P.
Morriss, "This State Will Soon Have Plenty of Laws" - Lessons
From One Hundred Years ofCodification in Montana, 56 MONT.

66
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See generally Jean Louis Bergel, Principal Features and
Methods ofCodification, 48 LA. L. REV. 1073 (1988).

70

71

See id. at 1088.
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It does not involve any creative social engineering that is
geared towards the normative comprehension of an ideal
social order. It is, instead:
[A]n administrative undertaking aimed only at
grouping together preexisting and scattered rules
without modifying their content. It is nothing
but a compilation for the purpose offacilitating,
through their gathering, the knowledge of
numerous rules, from varied and scattered
sources. In other words, it is a purely formal
gathering and unification of texts. 72

although common law codes are easy to update, they
present a special problem for the interpreter because they
are easily outdated by social change. 80
In contrast to common-law formal codification,
substantive codification, as in civil codes, "consists of
devising and shaping a coherent body of new or renovated
rules within a whole aimed at instituting or reviewing a
legal order," and "presupposes a rather elaborate clear,
precise and definite written law .... "81 Consider the
following elaboration:
A [substantive] code stems from the will of its
authors to consecrate a doctrine and to translate
a specific inspiration into positive law. Even
though the innovative forces vary according to
the circumstances, a true codification aims at
instituting a coherent body of new or renewed
legal rules destined to either establish a new
order or to restore the preexisting order. It
occurs only after a thorough research, a general
reflection, and a creative effort through which
choices have been made, guidelines laid down
and, lastly, decisions taken. Thus, in France,
the 1804 Civil Code was based on fundamental
ideas which were quite new at the time: the
uniformity of the law throughout the whole
territory; the acknowledgement oflegislation as
the only real source of law; the
comprehensiveness of the law regulating all
social relations; the separation of law from
morals, religion, and politics. 82

The important point here is that U.S. codes, as
products of formal codification, do not present a syllogistic
framework for future development. 73 As "statute codes,"74
they lack rules ofinterpretation. 75 They are after-the-fact
compilations of mere statutory recitations,76 and do not
comprehend those general principles that allow for a
deductive application, as is the case with civil codes. 77
Because they contain problem-responding enactment,
formal codes rank experience over doctrinal logic. 78 This
is in line with the common law's traditional caution against
"freezing" the law in ancient philosophy. 79 As a result,

721d. at lO89 (citations omitted).
73

See id. at 1092.

See Bruce Donald, Codifications in Common Law Systems, 47
AusT. L. REV. 160,171 (1973).

74

75

Ideally, the drafting of substantive codes begins with
the philosophical writings of a celebrated jurist or a group

See Bergel, supra note 70, at 1092.

As Bergel notes, see id., this is done usually by grouping the
law in an alphabetical order according to the subject-matters.
See, for example, the Maryland Code, beginning with the
Agriculture Article, and ending with the Transportation Article.

76

77

See Bergel, supra note 70, at 1090.

See id. at 1092. Because "statute codes" are easy to update
does not mean that they routinely have been updated. Legislative
politics may present a greater obstacle to a statute's revision
than its original enactment, especially given congressional
schedules.

78

See id.

81

[d. at 1077-78.

79

See id.

82

[d. at 1078.

80
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of eminent jurists, who the legislature may entrust to
transform those writings into codes, or whose writings may
begin as a specific commission by the legislature to draft
the codes. 83 As described in the quoted passage above,
substantive codification strives to create a long-lasting
framework and direction of the law. 84 The focus usually
is on uniformity and stability, as the codes are written with
such a prospective vigor as to go beyond a simple, cyclical
legislation. 85 Regardless of what they are called "complete comprehensive,"86 "institutional
comprehensive,"87 "fully comprehensive,"88 or "field
comprehensive"89 - substantive codes are not mere
compilations ofindividual statutes, but legislatively adopted
statements of durable legal doctrines. They present
"organized system [sJof general rules which will be easy
to discover so that from these rules, through an easy
process,judges and citizens may deduce the manner in
which this or that practical difficulty must be solved."90
Unlike American "statute codes," they are not the
spontaneous results oflegislative politics, but, instead,
embody a systematic conception of a coherent judicial
philosophy. Thus, from a stated general principle, the
interpreter of such a code can, through logical reasoning,
deduce the solution to any given problem; there really is

See id. Professor Bergel gives the following examples:
Switzerland's civil code that was drafted by E. Huber; France's
new family law coming from Dean 1. Carbonnier's writing; and the
Napoleonic Code drafted by a commission of jurists. See id.
83

84

See id.

8S

See id. at 1079.

86

See Donald, supra note 74, at 164-65.

87

See id. at 165-68.

little need to consult the legislature for answers to
interpretation questions. This is because the code should
be "broad enough to be able to regulate various real
situations."91 While the advantages of this system are
numerous, it may be criticized as retarding law's evolution
and progress,n especially in a system where the judge
must contribute actively to law's development. Hence, they
should not be subjected to the same rules of interpretation
that govern common-law statutes-codes.

III. NOTABLE APPROACHES TO STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION
Whatever differences exist among modem theories
of statutory construction may relate especially to
disagreements about (1) the judge's function in American
constitutional democracy, and (2) how the judge can
perform that function without trampling the separation-ofpowers doctrine. These disagreements, however, are
overexagerated, and may tum out to be merely a subtle
projection of individual ideological bearings, which does
not really translate into a patent homage to the Constitution.
Although these approaches have certain similarities in their
premises, and may even share a blurry aspiration to an
otherwise unitary goal, three main theoretical camps can
be distinguished: purposivism, intentionalism, and
textualism.

A. Purposivism
Commonly associated with Henry Hart and Albert
Sacks, this theoretical approach is premised on the idea
that a statute's proper interpretation cannot emerge without

See Mark D. Rosen, What Has Happened to the Common Law?
- Recent American Codifications, and Their Impact on Judicial
Practice and the Law's Substantive Development, 1994 WIS. L.
REV. 1119, 1127-29(1994).

88

89

See id. at 1129-31.

See T. Huc, Commentaire et pratique du code civil 37 (1892),
quoted in Bergel, supra note 70, at 1080.

91

See id. at 1083.

92

See id. at 1079.

90
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a close attention to the statute's purpose. 93 Because, in
the legal-process tradition of Hart and Sacks, a statute
culminates from the legislative purpose of addressing a
particular problem, any reasonable attempt at discerning
the statute's meaning must include an understanding ofthat
purpose.94 Where the statute's literal interpretation would
lead to absurd results, therefore, the statute must be
interpreted in a manner consistent with the particular
purpose. 95 Consider the following example.
A statutory provision commands that "[c]orporations
... organized and operated for religious, charitable ... or
educational purposes" may not be required to pay taxes. 96
A certain University, which obviously is organized and
operated for "educational purposes," but does not consider
African-American applicants for admission into its
program, applies to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)

Professors Hart and Sacks, relying on Max Radin's legal realism,
had fonnulated two principal assumptions about legislation. They
argued, first, that every statute has some form of purpose or
objective and, second, that legislation involved an informed,
deliberative and efficient process which governs the legislative
quest for the particular purposive law. See generally HENRY HART
& ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND ApPLICATION OF LAW (1958); see also ALEXANDER
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 62 (1962) (discussing the importance of
purpose in statutory construction); LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN
QUEST OF ITSELF (1940) (fonnulating the theory that law is a function
of societal purpose); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to
Law, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 667 (1958) (arguing that statutory
interpretation- should be focused on a statute's purpose and
structure, not its words); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation,
43 HARV. L. REv. 863 (1930) (denouncing legislative intent in favor
of a legislative purpose as a tool of statutory interpretation). Cf
Frankfurter, supra note 45, at 528 (observing that statutes are the
practical media of communicating governmental purposes).

93

94

See supra note 93 and accompanying text.

See supra note 93 and accompanying text. This point is properly
captured by the Court's language in Holy Trinity Church v. United
States, 143 U.S. 457,459 (1892)( emphasis added): "It is a familiar
rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not
within the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the
intention of its makers."

95

96

for a tax-exempt status based on the provision above.
The IRS denies the request, citing the University's
discriminatory policy. The University appeals this
determination to the federal court, relying on the statutory
text. It argues that a literal interpretation of the text warrants
it a tax-exempt status. This argument is forceful. There is
nothing in the text that requires that, to deserve a taxexempt status, the University must be nondiscriminatory
in its organization and operation. To follow the statute's
text sheepishly, however, would mean agovemmental
support of discrimination - an absurd, .if not an
unconstitutional, result. Hence, to the purposivists, the
court must avoid such absurdity, and must, therefore,
consult the purpose and policy behind the statutory section.
This was precisely what the Supreme Court did in Bob
Jones University v. United States. 97
In that case, the Court disregarded the literal language
of § 501 (c )(3) of the Internal Revenue Code for the
purposivist view that "underlying all relevant parts of the
Code is the intent that entitlement to tax exemption depends
on meeting certain common law standards of charity namely, that an institution seeking tax-exempt status must
serve a public purpose and not be contrary to established
public policy [against discrimination].''98 The Court found
that the legislative purpose of § 501 (c)(3) was "to provide
tax benefits to charitable organizations, to encourage the
development ofprivate institutions that serve a useful public
purpose .... "99 It noted that "[t]ax exemptions for certain
institutions thought beneficial to the social order of the
country as a whole . .. are deeply rooted in our history .
..• "100 A discriminatory organization, it follows, goes
against such purpose.
The purposivist approach is based, of course, on
the necessary assumption that the statutory interpreter can

See 26 U.S.C. § 50 1(c)(3)(1 954).

97

461 u.S. 574 (1983). The factual narration in the text is a simplified
version of the facts in Bob Jones. See id. at 577-83.

981d.

at586.

991d. at 588.
1001d. (emphasis added).
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readily discern the purpose of every statute. IOI This
assumption is indeed correct to some extent. Some statutes
may actually contain purpose-sections - sections
announcing the purposes of the statutes. 102 In those
circumstances, the judge's job becomes a bit less
complicated. But the job is not altogether easy, because a
statute may contain more than one purpose in its text. 103
101 See Hart & Sacks, supra note 93, at 1156; see also Karl N.
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory ofAppellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons about how Statutes are to be construed, 3 V AND.
L. REv. 395, 400-402 (1950).

102 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1999)(declaring the purpose ofthe
Occupational Safety & Health Act (OSHA»:

Congressional statement of findings and declaration of
purpose and policy
(a) The Congress finds that personal injuries and
illnesses arising out of work situations impose a
substantial burden upon, and are a hindrance to,
interstate commerce in terms of lost production, wage
loss, medical expenses, and disability compensation
payments.
(b) The Congress declares itto be its purpose and policy,
through the exercise of its powers to regulate commerce
among the several States and with foreign nations and
to provide for the general welfare, to assure so far as
possible every working man and woman in the Nation
safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve
our human resources-

The difficult aspect is deciding which purpose applies to
the presenting situation. In that case, the purposivist
approach is a much more complicated endeavor, as the
search for the particular statute's purpose may even be
more confusing than the ambiguous text. For, where the
statute's purpose is not codified, the judge must sift
legislative records to decide on a purpose - a job that
may be akin to chasing a moving target. It is mainly for
this reason - the use oflegislative history - that opponents
of purposivism criticize the method. 104 But, although such
criticisms continue to intensify, purposivism remains a
common approach to statutory construction. 105

B. Intentionalism
Like the purposivist approach, intentionalism thrives
on the use oflegislative history, and also seeks to readily
go beyond a literal interpretation of statutory text to answer
the absurdity question. The basic notion of intentionalism
is that an exercise in statutory construction must revolve
around the legislative intent of a statute. 106 The interpreter
asks: what was the intent of the legislator in drafting the
particular statutory provision - "what were the drafters
thinking and why were they thinking this rather than
something else when they wrote the text?" 107

15 U.S.c. § 264I(b) (1997) (stating the purpose of the Asbestos
Hazard Emergency Response Act):
(b) Purpose
The purpose of this subchapter is(I) to provide for the establishment of Federal
regulations which require inspection for asbestoscontaining material and implementation of appropriate
response actions with respect to asbestos-containing
material in the Nation's schools in a safe and complete
manner;
(2) to mandate safe and complete periodic
reinspection of school buildings following response
actions, where appropriate; and
(3) to require the Administrator to conduct a study
to find out the extent of the danger to human health
posed by asbestos in public and commercial buildings
and the means to respond to any such danger.
10]

See 15 U .S.c. § 2641, supra note 102.
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104

See infra Part III (D).

105 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Rehnquist Court. Statutory
Interpretation, Internal Burdens, and a Misleading Version of
Democracy,22 U. ToL. L. REv. 583, 594-95 (\991).

106 See generally James Landis, A Note on "Statutory
Interpretation," 43 HARV. L. REv. 886 (1930).

See Robert John Araujo, Method in Interpretation: Practical
Wisdom and the Search for Meaning in Public Legal Texts, 68
MISS. L.J. 225 (1998).
107
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Legislative intent should not be confused with
legislative purpose, even though attempts to differentiate
the two concepts may indeed be laborious. IDS One can
distinguish the concepts by looking closely at the questions
implicated. While "purpose" asks the "why" question,
"intent" goes more to the "how" and "what." As to purpose,
the interpreter asks why the legislators enacted a particular
statute - the general goal of the statute. For intent, the
issue is how the legislators intended to use a particular
provision to achieve the statutory goal (or purpose). One
asks: How did the legislators mean to apply the provision?
What did they intend to communicate or achieve when
they used such and such words? Did they intend the
particular result to which the court's interpretation leads?
"Intent," thus, reveals inore ofthe text's intended meaning,
and "purpose" is simply the broad goal of the statute.
As Professors Eskridge and Frickey noted, there are
at least three variants of intentionalism - three kinds of
intent that the statutory interpreter may seek: actual intent;
conventional intent; and imaginatively reconstructed
intent. I 09 As to actual intent, the statutory interpreter seeks
to understand what all of the enacting legislators actually
intended by the provision. I 10 This is not an easy task,
especially bearing in mind the number oflegislators involved

In fact, courts have variously employed the words in a
confusing manner, sometimes, using them interchangeably. See,
e.g., Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968,972 (1997) (emphasis
added) ("But even assuming the correctness of the Court of
Appeals' implicit premise-that a legislative purpose to interfere
with the constitutionally protected right to abortion without the
effect of interfering with that right ... could render the Montana
law invalid-there is no basis for finding a vitiating legislative
purpose here. We do not assume unconstitutional legislative
intent even when statutes produce harmful results .... "); Leavitt
v. Jane, 518 U.S. 137, 143 (1996) (emphasis added) ("Every
legislature that adopts, in a single enactment, provision A plus
provision B intends (A+B); and that enactment, which reads
(A+B), is invariably a 'unified expression of that intent,' so that
taking away A from (A+B), leaving only B, will invariably' clearly
undermine the legislative purpose' to enact (A+B). But the fallacy
in applying this reasoning to the severability question is that it is
not the severing that will take away A from (A+B) and thus foil
the legislature's intent.").
108

in the formulation of such intent. III Thus, the interpreter
may rely on conventional intent. Conventional intent can
be gleaned from the statements of those who worked
closely with the statute throughout its enactment - the
legislation's sponsors and floor managers, for instance. 112
This may be done through such legislative records as
committee reports and records of floor debates. 113 This
is a "de facto representative intent" in the sense that the
intent of few legislators is imputed to the whole legislature.
The third variant of intentional ism - Judge Posner's
imaginative reconstruction - presents a two-part analysis. I 14
First, the interpreting judge tries to "put himselfin the shoes
of the enacting legislators and figure out how they would
have wanted the statute applied to the case before him."IIS
If this inquiry is fruitless, "the judge must [then] decide
what attribution of meaning to the statute will yield the
most reasonable result ... ," bearing in mind "it is [the
legislators '] conception of reasonableness, to the extent
known, rather than the judge's, that should guide the
decision. "116 Notwithstanding the variant of intentionalism
employed, the idea is thatthe judge must act "as the enacting
legislature's faithful servant, discovering and applying the
legislature's original intent." II 7 This indeed is the most
commonly employed of the approaches to interpretation. I IS
III See Radin, supra note 93, at 869-70 (observing that legislative
intent could not be the intent of all the legislators voting for the
statute).

112

See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 17, at 327.

113 See Landis, supra note 106, at 888-89 (discussing the values of
legislative records in discerning legislative intent). .

114 See Posner, supra note 17, at 286-93 [hereinafter, Federal
Courts]; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A
MISUNDERSTOOD RELATIONSHIP 4-14 (1988) [hereinafter, Posner, Law
& Literature].

115

Posner, Federal Courts, supra note 17, at 286-87.

1161d. at 287. This approach can be summarized thus: the first
issue relates to what the legislators would have wanted, and the
second is what they would have found reasonable or acceptable.
Notice that these questions are related on a continuum.

109

See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 17, at 325-32.

117

Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 17, at 325.

110

See id. at 326.

118

See id.
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c. Textualism
Unlike both pmposivism and intentionalism, textualism
denOlU1ces the use oflegislative history. To the textualistS,
statutory interpretation must not involve the quest for
legislative purpose and intent through legislative records.
Instead, the proper aim is to understand "the intent that a
reasonable person would gather from the text of the law,
placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris. "119
Intent and purpose, according to textuaiists, are objectified
by statutory text, not discoverable from legislative
history.12o Even where the text leads to absurd results,
and the judge must search for understanding outside the
particular provision, the judge should look only to the
structure ofthe statute, interpretations of similar provisions,
and canons of statutory construction. The judge should
also use these aids if the desire is merely to confirm the
literal interpretation of a text. 121
The textualist approach derives indeed from those
scholars who, influenced by public-choice theory (and law
and economics jurisprudence), strongly reject the
purposivist and intentionalist reliance on legislative
history.122 There are two main versions oftextualism. 123

There is the stricter version, which depends solely on the
text as the supreme source of meaning. 124 Relying on this
version, " '[w]e do not inquire what the legislature meant;
we ask only what the statute mean.' "125 This method
begins and ends with the literal interpretation of the text,
paying no attention to legislative intent. 126 Thus, ifa statute
states that "no one shall drive less than fifty miles per hour
on Interstate 95, between Richmond, Virginia and
Baltimore, Maryland," the strict textualist would not care
if Senior Citizen Smith drives thirty-five miles per hour
because of bad eyesight or inclement weather. She would
neither inquire whether the legislature intended the law to
apply with the same vigor at all times, nor consider the
fact that the legislature's purpose in enacting the law was
to curb ')oy-riding" on the freeway. The second variant
oftextuaiism is, however, "less ambitious."127 It relies on
a statute's text not as a replacement but as evidence ofthe
statute's legislative intent or purpose. 128 Following this
scheme, " '[t]here is ... no more persuasive evidence of
the purpose of a statute than the words by which the
legislature undertook to give expression of its wishes.' "129

119 Antonin Scalia, Common-law Courts in a Civil-Law System:
The Role ofthe United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the
Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL

COURTS AND THE LAW 16-17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter,
Scalia, Common-law Courts].
120 See id.
121 See William Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv.
621 , 624 (1990).

The public-choice theory rejects Hart and Sacks's view that
legislators are rational people striving to enact purposive laws
for public benefit. See Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the
122

Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77
MINN. L. REv. 241,250 (1992). Relying on public-choice postulates,

law and economics scholars argue that statutes represent broad
interest-group purposes in the form of legislative compromises.
See id. Thus, statutory construction must be restrained to the
codified evidence of these legislative compromises - the statutory
text; any attempt to look for a broader purpose outside the text
would lead to a deviation from what actually made it through the
legislative process. See id.
123

See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 17, at 340.
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124 See id.
125 Id. (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal
Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REv.417, 419 (1899), reprinted in OLIVER

WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 203, 207 (1920)).
126 See id.
1271d.
128 See id. at 341.
1291d. (quoting United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns., 310
U.S. 534,543 (1940)).
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The basic textualist arguments above are the basis
oftoday's prominent and highly reinvigorated textualismwhat Professor Eskridge calls The New Textualism. 130
In the new textualists' view, the judge's interpretative
scheme must be confmed to the four comers of a statute,
because "[i]fthe question of a statute's domain may not
often be resolved by reference to actual design, it may
never properly be resolved by reference to imputed
design." 13 I Statutory provisions, hence, must be interpreted
on the basis of ordinary (as opposed to legislative) context
and word-usage, and consitent with the whole body of
law within which the provision fits. 132 The notoriety ofthis
textualist brand followed Justice Scalia's ascension to, first,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and,
second, the United States Supreme Court. 133 His vigor in
projecting a textualist approach to interpretation is
premised on his dissatisfaction with both the purposivist
and intentionalist methods. 134

130 See Eskridge, supra note 121, at 623. Professor Eskridge uses
the word New Textualism to describe the new and modified wave
ofthe old plain-meaning method. See id. at 623. Contrasted with
the new textual ism, the old plain-meaning rule requires the
interpreter to begin a statutory analysis with the statute's text,
and to seek legislative history only when the text is not plain. See
id. at 626. Justice Antonin Scalia and Judge Frank Easterbrook
are two of the most notable new textualists. See generally Antonin
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. ON. L. REV. 849 (1989)
[hereinafter, Scalia, Originalism]; Easterbrook, Domains, supra
note 16; Frank Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in
Statutory Construction, II HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 59 (1988)
[hereinafter, Easterbrook, Original Intent]; Frank Easterbrook,
Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1119 (1998)
[hereinafter, Easterbrook, Textualism]; Scalia, Common-law
Courts, supra note 119; Scalia, Rules, supra note 16.

131

Easterbrook, Domains, supra note 16, at 537, 544.

132 See Eskridge, supra note 121, at 655 (citing Justice Scalia's
concurring opinion in Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 109 S.
Ct.1981,1994(1989)).

D. The Theoretical Battle About Legislative History

The philosophical war among the purposivists,
intentionalists, and textualists is actually an academic battle
over the use of legislative history in statutory
construction. 135 Between the purposivists and
intentionalists, the battle concerns what the interpreter
should seek in legislative history - purpose or intent. 136
The dispute between the purposivists and intentionalists
on one hand and the textualists on the other stems from
the latter's general disdain for any reliance on legislative
history.137 The arguments for and against these three camps
are well stated. Beginning with purposivism, the
problematic nature of a successful quest for legislative
purpose, especially through legislative history, negates any
sole reliance on this method. This is because, for the most
part, legislative purpose may be neither rational nor unitary.
A statute's purpose may be as reasonable as a lobbyist's
desires, or as divisive as the ideological or political camps
of legislators. While, for example, Congress may
sometimes aspire to a unitary goal, it is no gainsaying that
it may also produce 535 individual goals that might be
difficult to coordinate. 138 As noted by one commentator,
"[y]ou couldn't [even] gettwo-thirds of[] Congress to
vote for the Ten Commandments." 139 Thus, Congress may
not in fact produce purposive statutes; 140 "[t]he complex
compromises endemic in the political process suggest that
legislation is frequently a congeries of different and
sometimes conflicting purposes."141 This makes a statutory

135 See Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Sacratic
Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REv.4, 18 (1998).

136

See generally Radin, supra note 93.

IJ7

See generally Scalia, Common-law Courts, supra note 119.

138 See JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND POLICIES
34 (2d ed. 1995).

139 See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (reporting the
comment of one interviewee in the author's survey).

133

See id. at 651.

140

See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 17, at 334.

134

See Scalia, Common-law Courts, supra note 119, at 16-17.

141

See id. at 335.
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interpreter's dependence on legislative purpose an exercise
in futility.
More challenging than the search for legislative
purpose, however, is the search for intent. The subjective
nature ofintent, and the multiplicity ofcongressional intent,
makes it problematic for even a veteran statutory interpreter
to succeed in its extrication. While the intent of some
legislators in including a particular provision in a statute
may be that they actually believed in the provision, other
legislators may have simply decided to avoid a filibuster. 142
Therefore, as Professors Eskridge and Frickey noted, any
reliance on actual or conventional search for a provision's
legislative intent may lead to indeterminate results. 143 Judge
Posner's imaginative reconstruction is similarly flawed. Its
assumption that thejudge could reconstruct the past
understanding of a prior legislature does not account for
the individual biases that may infiltrate the judge's view of
that history. 144 Additionally, the method neglects any social
change that may have taken place subsequent to the
statute's enactment, as to devalue the particular legislature's
previous understanding. 145 In all, such imaginative
reconstruction, with a noisy ring ofsubjectivity, works little
or no trick to change what is actually a mere record of
political quibbles into a judicious approach to construction.
The textualists' qualms with purposivism and
intentionalism do not end with the points above. Instead,
they vigorously project the disregard for legislative history.
To be sure, they rely adamantly on a statute in question,
even for a context. 146 They search through a statute's
structure and through other similar statutes for the statute's
legislative intent. 147 A reliance on legislative history,

142

For an excellent discussion of how Congress works, see

generally CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: A REFERENCE, RESEARCH AND LEGISLATIVE GUIDE (1989).
143

according them, gives judges an unlimited power to
manipulate a statute. 148 For, "under the guise or even
delusion of pursuing unexpressed legislative intents,
common-law judges will in fact pursue their own objectives
and desires, extending their proclivities from the common
law to the statutory field. "149
To the textualists, such judicial activism is
unconstitutional and must not be encouraged through the
acceptance oflegislative history as an interpretative tool. 150
But, as noted earlier, and would be argued further below,
this criticism is myopic. It overlooks the nature of American
codes, which sometimes require the judge to view beyond
the text of a statute. It also ignores the fact that the
enforcement ofa legislative mandate is more probable with
an understanding of the process of formulating that
mandate, than with an academic reliance on the uniformity
of grammatical rules. In fact, to dismiss legislative intent
or purpose is tantamount to giving judges the latitude to
engage unconstitutionally injudiciallegislation. This is
especially so as any intent garnered from an attenuated
text (because a statutory text becomes attenuated if
unclear) negates the respect for legislative supremacy.
After all, ifthe legislators had expressed their intent clearly
through the text, it is unlikely that both the lawyers and the
trial judge would miss it. Otherwise, the intent is not that
clear, but is what an individual judge infers.
The textualist argument against judicial activism is
flawed primarily because of an erroneous definition, and a
misplaced demonization, ofsuch activism. Judicial activism,
to the textualists, occurs when the judge discards the
statutory text and relies on legislative history to arrive at a
preferred result. 151 This, indeed, borders on a violation of
the judge's oath of office. Judicial activism, contrary to
the textualists' definition, is actually a judge's attempt to
balance justice with the respect for legislative supremacy. 152

See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 17, at 328.
148

144

See id. at 330.

145

See id. at 330-31.

See Scalia, Common-law Courts, supra note 119, at 17-18.

1491d.

146 See Easterbrook, Domains, supra note 16, at 544-46. Sfle
generally Eskridge, supra note 121, at 655.
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See id.
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See infra Part IV.

Articles
Passivity in statutory interpretation - what I calljudicial
zombism - is foreign to the American conunon-law root,
and disharmonious with the institutional notion ofjustice.
Judicial stewardship must not be a passive participation in
constitutional democracy. Textualism is simply judicial
passivity, akin to ignoring the distress calls ofa crime victim
upon the robotic view that you are not a police officer.
These issues will now be explored in detail.

IV. JUDICIAL PASSIVITY
A. Brogan v. United States: 153 A Case-note of
Judicial Passivity
A classic example ofjudicial passivity is the Supreme
Court's modem construction of the False Statements
Accountability Act. 154 In Brogan, the Court construed

153

118 S. Ct. 805 (1998).

154

18 U.S.c. § 100 I (2000). Section 100 1(a) currently states:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the
executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the
Government of the United States, knowingly and
willfully(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme,
or device a material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent
statement or representation; or
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing
the same to contain any materially false,
fictitious, or fraudu lent statement or entry; shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or
both."

First enacted in 1863, the predecessor to § 100 1 was intended to
curb fraudulent claims with government agencies. See Brogan,
118 S. Ct. at 813. In 1934, Congress broadened the statute to
include its present language, which goes beyond claims or
statements that are made to defraud the government. See id. As
a result of this expansion by Congress, the government has used
the statute to prosecute a wide range of defendants. See id.
Federal prosecutors have typically relied on § 100 I to
bring charges against individuals for any false statements to
federal agents. See generally Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, What
Statements Fall Within Exculpatory Denial Exception to
Prohibition, Under 18 u.s. CA. § 1001, Against Knowing and
Willfully Making False Statement Which is Material to Matter
Within Jurisdiction of Department or Agency of United States,

§ 100 1 of the Act as proscribing the denial of an accusation
by federal agents that one has obtained a bribe, even where

102 A.L.R. FED. 742 (1991). The statute, even in its currenttext,
does not seem to distinguish voluntary from responsive false
statements. See 18 U.S.C. § 100 I (a)(2) (2000). Accordingly, courts
have applied it to both situations. See Thomas, supra, at 742.
Moreover, in contrast to the 1893 Act that applied to only filed
false claims, the broad language of § 1001 does not differentiate
between verbal and written statements. See id. Thus, courts
tended to apply it to both types of statements.
The Supreme Court first examined the scope of § 100 I
(formerly, 18 U.S.c. § 80) in UnitedStatesv. Gilliland 312 U.S. 86
(\ 941). Gilliland involved several defendants who willfully and
fraudulently reported inaccurate amounts of petroleum produced
from certain oil wells. See id. at 87. The Court rejected the argument
that § 1001 applied to only those matters in which the'government
had a financial or proprietary interest. See id. at 93. The court,
tracing the legislative history of the statute, noted that the statute
resulted from Congress's answer to the call by the Interior
Secretary as to the serious problem of fraudulent claims,
particularly in the 1934 era. However, Congress later broadened
the statute to include all false statements made to government
agents. See id. Instead, the Court observed that the statute was
intended to "protect the authorized functions of governmental
departments and agencies from perversion which might result
from ... deceptive practices." [d.
Subsequent to Gilliland, prosecutions under § 100 1
broadened in scope. See Giles A. Birch, Comment, False
Statements to Federal Agents: Induced Lies and the Exculpatory
No, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1273 (1990) (arguing that courts should
dismiss § 100 1 charges if agents induce lies from suspects). In
1953, federal prosecutors brought, for the first time, § 1001 charges
against a defendant for merely lying to federal agents in the course
of an investigation. See United States v. Levin, 133 F. Supp. 88 (D.
Colo. 1953). In Levin, the defendant was convicted for lying to
FBI agents in the course of investigating the defendant for a
stolen emerald ring. See id. After Levin, several defendants were
prosecuted for lying to federal agents. See Birch,.id. at 1276.
These prosecutions subsequently extended to mere denials of
wrongdoing. See id.
As a result ofthe potential for abuse and injustice, many
federal judges were troubled by how broadly § 1001 was applied.
See id. at 1279. This was especially so as § 1001 prosecutions
raised two serious issues: departure from the original intent of
the statute, and the near violation of the Fifth Amendment. See
id. Thus, in 1962, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, in Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298 (5th Cir.
1962), formulated the "exculpatory no" doctrine. See Birch, id. at
1280. The doctrine became a defense to § 1001 charges, excusing
the mere false denial of wrongdoing. See generally Paternostro,
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the Government has not yet proven such a crime. 155 . The
Court ruled that § 100 I did not exclude a mere denial of
wrongdoing.156 The Court rejected the "exculpatory no"
doctrine as not within the text of § 100 1. 157 In so holding,
the Court overruled those past decisions embracing the
"exculpatory no" doctrine. 158
By abrogating the "exculpatory no" doctrine as'a
defense to § 100 1 charges, the Court has undone more
than forty years of restricting the broad language of the
statute. 159 The Court's decision hence refurbishes the
problems that prompted the "exculpatory no" doctrine.
Without any limitations on its reach, § 100 1 presents two-

311 F.2d 298. With this doctrine, statements made by the accused
to exculpate themselves, whether later proven to be false or not,
were not indictable. Following the Fifth Circuit, seven other circuits
adopted the doctrine. The Fifth Circuit, however, in 1994,
abrogated the doctrine. See United States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 14
F.3d 1040(1994).
155 See Brogan, 118 S.Ct. at 807. Brogan was convicted for lying to
federal agents from the Department of Labor and the Internal
Revenue Service. See id. He was an officer of a union that
represented workers of JRD Management Corporation in New
York ("JRO"). See id. He was alleged to have collected some
cash or gifts (bribe) from JRD. See id. Federal agents went to his
home to question him about the bribe. See id. While there, they
asked him if he received cash from JRD. He replied "no." See id.
Unknown to him, the agents had, before going to his home,
obtained some records showing that he received the money in
question. See id. Hence, after he denied receiving the money, the
agents produced the records, and advised him that it was a federal
offense to lie to agents. See id. at 808. Brogan was subsequently
charged and convicted under the False Statement Act in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York. See
id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed Brogan's conviction. See id. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari. See id. The Court, Justice Scalia writing, affirmed
Brogan's conviction. See id.

156

See Brogan, 118 S Ct. at 809.

157

See id.

158 See, e.g., Moser v. United States, 18 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Taylor, 907 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1990); United States
v. Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1988).

159

See Birch, supra note 153, at 1277.
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layered chances for prosecuting the unwary suspect. 160
To assure a conviction, federal investigators could simply
engineer a mere denial of wrongdoing that may very well
derive from a suspect's fear ofself-incrimination. As noted
by one commentator, "the authority to force suspects to
admit their guilt either by words or silence, is an lUlusual
power in the hands of an investigative agent."161 This is an
absurdity, and the potential for prosecutorial abuse is
enormous. Equally striking is the court's belated loss of
confidence in its earlier acquiescence in the "exculpatory
no" doctrine. Although the Court has had ample
opportilllities to abolish the "exculpatory no" doctrine, I 62
it waited more than forty years to do SO.163 The Court's
ruling raises several questions regarding approaches to
statutory construction.
Justice Scalia did not see any need to deviate from
what he interpreted as Congress's command through the
text of § 100 1.164 According to Justice Scalia, the text, as
applied to Brogan's situation, was lUlambiguous. 165 It
categorically proscribed giving "any false statement of
whatever kind" to a federal investigator. 166 In falsely
answering "no" to the agents' question, in Justice Scalia's
view, Brogan made a false statement within the purview
of § 100 l.167 Whether that statement amounted to a mere
denial of wrongdoing was irrelevant. This was because
there was nothing in § 100 1 that excused a mere denial of

160

See id.

16~

See id. at 1287.

162

See id.

163 Particularly notable is the fact that the Court's decision comes
four years after the Fifth Circuit, which originated the "exculpatory
no" doctrine, rejected the doctrine. See United States v. RodriguezRios, 14F.3d 1040 (5th Cir. 1994).

164

See Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 809.

165

See id. at 808.

166

See id.

167

See id. at 809.
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wrongdoing. 168 Thus, the "exculpatory no" doctrine
departed from the statute's text. 169 Again, relying on the
text, Justice Scalia also rejected the contention that § 1001
was meant to punish only those statements that perverted
governmental functions. 170
Justice Scalia's analysis is consistent with the textualist
approach to statutory construction. As a professed
textualist, he would not "restrict the unqualified language
of[§ 1001] to the particular evil that Congress was trying
to remedy."171 To do so, would "render democratically
adopted texts mere springboards for judicial
lawmaking."I72 This position reiterates his view that the
Court ought to interpret the law as Congress enacted it. 173
Even when a judge perceives the broader social purposes
a statute serves, the judge has no authority to fill the gap
that may exist in the statute's text. 174 Otherwise, the judge
would be making, not interpreting, the law. 175 Therefore,
according to Justice Scalia, the legislative intent of § 1001
is irrelevant, because the text is plain and unambiguous. 176
The argument above is forceful. There is nothing
illogical about assuming that a statute means what its text
conveys. One should ordinarily have faith in the legislature
to draft clear and unambiguous law. A statute's meaning
should naturally come from its text. Section 1001 seems
clear from its text. The meaning that Jllstice Scalia ascribes
to it is reasonable. 177 When closely examined, however,

168

See id.

169

See id.

Justice Scalia's reading is not the only reasonable reading
of § 1001. Despite what the textualists may think,
congressional grammar is not as perfect as one would
anticipate. Although it is a good idea to follow Justice
Scalia's advice and apply the meaning that "a wise and
intelligent person" I78 ascribes to § 1001 ,judges possess
different levels of wisdom and intelligence. As such, the
textualist approach becomes "as open to arbitrary judicial
discretion and expansion as the use oflegislative intent, or
other interpretive methods, if the text-mindedjudge is so
inclined." I79
A text is amenable to different interpretations, and,
thus, manipulable. The Court's decision in Hubbard v.
United States I80 buttresses this point. In Hubbard,181 an
opinion in which Justice Scalia concurred, 182 the Court
reversed how it originally interpreted § 1001 in United
States v. Bramblett. 18 ) The issue in Bramblett was the
meanings of "department" and "agency" in § 1001.184 The
Bramblett Court concluded that these words meant all
branches of the government. I85 Forty years later, the Court
was not so sure. Although nothing about these words in §
1001 changed to show them in a different light, the
Hubbard Court ruled that "department," as used in this
section, excluded the judiciary.186 Thus, the Court
recognized the ')udicial function" exception to § 1001.187

178

See Scalia, Common-law Courts, supra note 119, at 18.

179

Gordon S. Wood, Comment, in Scalia, Common-law Courts,

supra note 119, at 63.
170

See id.
180

514 U.S. 695 (1995).

1711d.
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See Scalia, Common-law Courts, supra note 119, at 17.
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See id.; see also supra Part III.

174

See id.
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See id.
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See Brogan, 118 S.Ct. at 809.

It must be reasonable for six of nine justices to agree with
Justice Scalia.

181

See id. at 706.
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See id. at 716 (Scalia, 1., concurring).

183

348 U.S. 503 (1955).
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See id. at 504.
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See id. at 509.
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Hubbard, 514 U.S. at714.
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See id at 709-11.
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The Court saw Bramblett as a seriously flawed decision,
because "the Bramblett Court made no attempt to
reconcile its interpretation with the usual meaning of
department." 188 The problem with this reasoning is
precisely why the vacuous reading of a text is flawed. As
Justice Scalia stated in Hubbard, the potential for mischief
is great in a mistaken reading. 189 Why, for example, did
the Hubbard Court interpret "department" to exclude the
judiciary? What is usual about this definition?
Most often, a statutory text is not as plain as it appears
at first blush. Justice Scalia, in Brogan, interpreted the
text, "any false statement" to mean all false statements,
including a "no" response to a question. 190 However, when
read with the word, "makes," the phrase, "any false
statement" excludes a responsive pleading, as in defendant
Brogan's one-word denial of wrongdoing. Although a
statement may mean "that which is stated ... in words of
facts or opinions,"191 the word "make" is susceptible to a
wide range of interpretations, all of which suggest an
affirmative act. l92 Even Justice Scalia has in the past
concurred in such an "affirmative" definition. In Patterson
v. MacLean Credit Union,193 he joined Justice Kennedy
in holding that the phrase "to make" meant "to form."
Whereas, the dictionary defines "form" in at least fortyone ways, the most relevant of which means "to construct

1881d. at 702 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
For its "usual" meaning of "department," the Court relied primarily
on how 18 U.S.C. § 6 defined that word, see id. at 700, even
though it faulted the Bramblett Court for relying on 18 U .S.C. §
287 (the so-called statutory cousin of section 100 I), see id. at 702703 (a part of the majority opinion in which Justice Scalia
concurred).

or frame (ideas, opinions, etc) in the mind."194 These words
are not derivative but initiative in nature. The usual 195
meaning of "make" in Brogan's situation, therefore, was
the initiative act ofdoing, not the reactive or defensive one
ofresponding. To be sure, the word "no" is used normally
with a comparative;196 it is a negative response (a
derivative). So, even ifit is a "statement," it is not the
affirmative declaration required by § 100 1.
The terms "knowingly and willingly," and the apparent
flavor of § 100 1, fortify the argument above. 197 Although
Brogan conceded "knowingly and willfully" responding to
the agents' question, 198 these words show how disputable
the Court's interpretation is of "making a false statement"
under § 100 1. The word "knowingly" underscores the
fact that § 100 1 does not apply to all false statements.
What if the question to Brogan was whether he received
"a bribe," as opposed to receiving some cash? In that
case, for "no" to be a false response, he must know that
receiving some cash translates into receiving "a bribe."
But, is whether one received a bribe not a triable issue for
the jury to decide? For Brogan, therefore, to knowingly
answer falsely, he would have had to be his ownjury, as
the federal agents already are his judges. This questionable
result becomes clearer when one considers the word
"willfully."
To "willfully" make a statement is to volunteer or
take the initiative to declare words offacts or opinion. 199
A constructive duress contaminates such element ofwill
in a criminal investigative circumstance. It is unlikely that
one "willfully" responds to a federal agent's inculpatory
question, especially when one does not fully appreciate
the right to remain silent in that situation. Little wonder the
statute does not state, "whoever knowingly and willfully
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See id. at 7 I 6.

194

See Webster's, supra note 192, at 523.
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Brogan, I 18 S.Ct. at 808.

19S

Relying on the Court's reasoning in Hubbard.

191 See id. at 807 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
246 I (2d ed. 1950)).

See RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 820 (1992
ed.).
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See Webster's, supra note 192, at 9 I 9.
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See Brogan, I 18 S.Ct at 807.
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See
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See Webster's, supra note 192, at 1524.
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491 U.S. 164(1989).
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responds." The literal reading of the text, therefore, does
not furnish a complete understanding of § 1001.

B. Rethinking Justice Scalia's New Textualism
The textualist approach to statutory construction is
appealing in many respects. A statute's text is the most
relevant evidence of its command. The out-of-text
statements by legislators, presented to support the truth
of a statute must be excluded as "legislative hearsay."
Because such congressional statements, for the most part,
are not consensual, they lack constitutional legitimacy.
They may also be susceptible to judicial manipulation. As
observed in the preceding section, Justice Scalia clutches
to this rationale as the basis for his brand of textualism. 200
This projection is consistent with his shift in focus from the
formalist argument that textualism is consistent with the
separation-of-powers principle to the functionalist attitude
that it curtails judicial legislation. 201
The main appeal of textual ism, however, is the
predictability and uniformity that is achievable by limiting
judicial decisions to statutory text. For, as Justice Scalia
notes, when the judge's interpretative job goes beyond
the textual rule oflaw, there exists the danger that "equality
of treatment is difficult to demonstrate ... predictability is
destroyed [and] judicial arbitrariness is facilitated ... "202
Consider, for example, the Court's decision in Holy Trinity
Church v. United States. 203
In that case, the Court construed a statute that made
it "unlawful for any person ... to ... in any way assist or
encourage the importation or migration of any alien ...
into the United States ... to perform labor or service of
any kind . ... "204 The issue was whether the Holy Trinity

200

See supra Part III (C).

See Eskridge, supra note 121, at 656; see also Roger Colinvaux,
What Is Law? A Search for Legal Meaning and Good Judging
Under Textualist Lens, 72 IND. LJ. 1133 (1997) (analyzing the
efficacy of the textual ist approach to statutory interpretation).

201

202

Scalia, Rules, supra note 16, at 1175.

20)

143 V.S.457 (1892).

204

Id at 458.

Church violated this provision when it brought arninister
into the United States. 205 The statute, in another section,
exempted certain occupations but did not exempt
ministers.206 Yet the Court ruled that Congress did not
intend to prohibit ministers from coming into the country
when it enacted the statute, citing congressional records. 207
This is so, according to Justice Brewer, because the United
States was a Christian nation that would not exclude
ministers from its shores. 2os
Although it has been suggested that Justice Brewer's
religious background influenced his opinion in Holy
Trinity,209 his reliance more on congressional records than
on a seemingly clear text is remarkable. Even for ardent
followers oflegislative history, Justice Brewer's use of
congressional records to support his "Christian nation"
rationale in Holy Trinity borders on judicial politicking.
The textualist argument, therefore, is reasonable in such a
situation. There may be times when judges go too far in
using legislative history. These judges "run the risk of
imposing their own notion ofpublic interest upon the inferred
purpose of the language they interpret."210 The risk is
heightened when the majority ofjudges in the particular
COUlt share the same social, religious or political views.
The result may be judicial legislation, removed from
statutory construction. This problem, however, is not
peculiar to the use oflegislative history.

205

See id.

206

See id. at 458-59.

201 See id at 465. The Court, relying on committee reports, noted a
difference between "brain toilers," a category to which ministers
belonged, and "manual laborers," the importation of whom was
the "evil" Congress sought to correct through the statute. Id at
463.

208

See id. at 466.

See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC
POLICY, at 523, n. 2 (2d. ed. 1995) (pointing to the factthat Justice
Brewer was a minister's son).

209

210 See Russell Holder, Say What You Mean and Mean What You
Say: The Resurrection of Plain Meaning in California Courts,
30 V.c. DAVIS L. REV. 569, 586, n. 99 (1997).
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As noted previously, a statute's text is as manipulable
as congressional records. To completely ignore a statute's
history, for a stringent adherence to its text, does not
account for the danger inherent in the semantic
manipulation oftext, or erase the differences in how judges
comprehend the English language. Justice Scalia's brand
of textual ism is fallacious in three crucial respects. First, it
erroneously assumes that the English or legal language is
scientifically precise, and that all judges are bound by the
same rules ofgrammar. Second, it flagrantly ignores how
important context is (or what context is most important)
to communication, especially statutory communication.
Lastly, Justice Scalia's personal practice exposes a
hypocrisy that defeats the textualist claim to judicial
consistency in statutory interpretation.
As in Brogan, Justice Scalia's approach confines a
statute to a narrow-minded universe. It cuts off the head
and tail of the statute and traps the body in a vacuous
"text-tube," and then calls for its magical revival via judicial
lexicology. But, even iflexicology were a science, the
English language, or the legal language, for that matter,
does not enjoy the luxury of scientific precision. The idea
that a disputed text is plain and unambiguous, in a sense,
invites the view that the lawyers arguing over such a text
are either poorly educated or engaged in frivolity. At a
minimum, it suggests the omnipotence ofthe judicial lens.
Such an idea disregards the fact that judges often disagree
as to the plainness of a text. 211 This is especially so as the
legal language is even more complicated than the ordinary
English language. Otherwise, there would be no need for
legal training. Justice Scalia understands this point. Indeed,
in his Confirmation Hearing before the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, he had noted: "[W]e do not normally
have a lawsuit in front of us if the language of a statute is
clear. "212

Justice Scalia understands also that political
compromises affect a statute's clarity. 213 The problem is
further complicated when the statute is a social
legislation. 214 When one adds the congressional logistics
involved in legislating to "any frailty in draftsmanship, and
the malleability and imperfections of English words, the
likelihood that one would fmd plain language diminishes
dramatically."215 The textualists begin to fail when,
because they denounce extra-textual sources, they so
readily fmd plain language.
According to Professor Plaas, Justice Scalia, in his
textualist approach, is quick to conclude that a provision
is plain and amenable mainly because he defines "plain" in
a broad manner.216 The broader he defines "plain," the
narrower the chances that a provision is vague or
ambiguous. 217 By avoiding the conclusion of vagueness
and ambiguity, "he rationalizes his reliance on interpretive
devices that may not have been considered or relied on in
the legislative process."218 This leads him to a resultoriented analysis.219 In other words, he more easily
manipulates the text of a provision. Take, for example,
his dissenting opinion in Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter
ofCommunities for a Greater Oregon. 220 The issue in

213 See Stephen A. Plaas, The Illusion and Allure ofTextualism,
40 YILL. L. REv. 93, 105 (1995) (commenting on Justice Scalia's
dissenting opinion in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S.
616,67 I (1986». In that case, Justice Scalia said: "To make matters
worse, [the majority] assays the current Congress' [s] desires with
respect to the particular provision in isolation, rather than (the
way the provision was originally enacted) as part of a total
legislative package containing many quids pro quo" (emphasis
added). See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 67 I .

214

Plaas, supra note 2 I 3, at 105.

2151d.

One need only sift through the Supreme Court's opinions in
the past two years to understand that a statute's plainness is in
the eyes of the beholder.
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Confirmation Hearing Before Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
99th Congo 65 (I 986)(statement of Antonin Scalia, Supreme Court
nominee).
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See id. at 106.
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See id.
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See id.

22°515U.S.687(J995).

Articles
Babbit was the logical construction of the Endangered
Species Act. 221 Section 9 of the Act prohibits a person
from "taking" a species. 222 The question for the Court
was what the Act meant by "take." The Act defines
"take" to include "harm," but does not define the latter.223
The Department ofInterior, in its regulations of fish and
wildlife services, defines "hann" to include the modification
ofthe species' habitat in a way that injures or kills members
of the species.224 The Court considered whether this
definition was correct. m To answer this question, the
Court relied on its analysis in Chevron U.SA., Inc. v.
NRDC. 226
The Court found the word "take" to be ambiguous
and so deferred to the agency.227 The majority, relying on
the Act's legislative history and the ordinary meaning of
"harm," adopted the agency's definition.228 Justice Scalia,

221

!d. at 690.

The Endangered Species Act specifically provides: "[W]ith
respect to any endangered species of fish or wildlife ... it is
unlawful for any person ... to ... (B) take any such species within
the United States ... " 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1988& Supp.).

m

Section 3( 19) defines "take" as "to harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect or attempt to
engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (emphasis
added).

22J

224

See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (\ 994).

m

Babbit, SIS U.S. at 690.

on the other hand, did not find any ambiguity in the
provision, and, therefore, saw no need to defer to the
agency. He relied, instead, on such interpretive devices
as the dictionary, Blackstone commentaries and statements
by the Solicitor of the Fish and Wildlife Service.229 He
then construed "take" not to include "harm" as defined in
the agency's regulations. Instead, "take" and "harm,"
according to him, fell within "the sense of affirmative
conduct intentionally directed against a particular animal
or animals," not the indirect action ofmodifYing the animal's
habitat. 230
One may advance many theories as to why Justice
Scalia thought that how he defined "harm" in Rabbit was
the only way to define the word, but none of the theories
points to the efficacy of the textualist approach. The word
"harm" in the Rabbit situation is not plain and unambiguous
but susceptible to many definitions. But, even if one were
to follow its ordinary meaning, there is nothing
unreasonable about "harm" being the indirect result of
modifYing an animal's habitat. 231 An animal is "harmed"
when one destroys its habitat. It is also harmed when it is
met by the hunter's bullet. The point is that, without an
appropriate context, a seemingly plain word may be lost
in a semantic war, which war the textualists use vigorously
to avoid legislative history.
On most occasions, Justice Scalia finds his context
in statutory words.232 When the words do not furnish
sufficient context, he resorts to the Whole-Act Rule, and
finds context in other parts ofthe statute that use similar

226

467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron stands for the proposition that
courts would construe an ambiguous statute as the governmental
agency that enforces the statute construes it. Thus:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill,
there is an express delegation of authority to the agency
to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation. Such legislative regulations are given
controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious,
or manifestly contrary to the statute.

229

See id. at 717-721.

230

See id. at 720.

227

Babbit, SIS U.S. at 690.

This is even more reasonable than Justice Scalia's interpretation
of "willingly making a false statement" to include the derivative
"no" answer in Brogan.

228

See id.

2J2

Jd. at 843-44.

231

See Scalia, Common-law Courts, supra note 119, at 23.
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words.233 This approach is problematic, because the idea
that one can rely on the context furnished by a confusing
act is self-defeating. Moreover, the Whole-Act Rule is
nothing more than a backdoor to legislative intent. The
idea is to get the whole act's flavor as to how the act
addresses what it is meant to address, so as to find a
provision's proper meaning. 234 This doubly processed
legislative intent should not be as forceful as that found in
congressional records.
The textualist approach assumes that words maintain
an independent existence. But words are alive only to the
extent of the dynamics between the speaker and the
perceiver. To quote Professor Plaas, "judges should not
be free to read the notes of a song written by Congress
without listening to the music."235 While it is rational to
construe a statute according to its text, Justice Scalia's
textualism ignores the fact that "words are not pebbles in
alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal existence;
and not only does the meaning of each interpenetrate the
other, but all in their aggregate take their purport from the
setting in which they were used .... "236
Justice Scalia's argument against legislative context
is that it is not reliable, and it creates the danger of')udicial
freewheeling."23? As to unreliability, he cites the fact that,
most often, legislators are not well versed in a statute's
text because they neither write the actual law nor pay

The idea of the Whole Act Rule is that each section of a
statute should be interpreted in the context of the whole act. See
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 209, at 644-645 ("The key to the
whole act approach is ... that all provisions and other features of
the enactment must be given force, and provisions must be
interpreted so as not to derogate from the force of other provisions
and features of the whole statute.").

attention when such is read on the floor of the House. 238
This "congressional passivity" argument, however, neither
makes up for the textualists' sole or enormous reliance on
statutory text, nor rights a ')udicial passivity." If the history
of a law cannot be trusted to shed light on the law, why
should the language of the law be trusted? As to judicial
freewheeling, that danger also permeates the textualist
approach. As noted above,judges do not follow uniform
rules of grammar. In fact, Brogan's reading of § 1001
derives from the majority's (more specifically, Justice
Scalia's) semantic freewheeling. Hence, if the majority is
wrong in interpreting § 1001, a new law is made, and the
textualists' fear ofjudicial freewheeling is nevertheless
realized.
Philosophical and literary theories indicate that
universal objectivity in statutory interpretation is an illusion,
because the interpreter's perspective will always mingle
with the text. 239 Judicial philosophy is ordinarily governed
by individual social, political and economic ideologies. 240
To be sure, Justice Scalia's grammatical compass (and,
so, his textual ism) is more often influenced by his
conservative ideology than his textualist fellowship.241 As
such, he is notoriously guilty ofjudicial freewheeling. On
many occasions, Justice Scalia has deviated from his
textualism, but very cleverly presents his opinions in a
textualist shell. 242 His "textualist malpractice" is most
2J8

See id. at 32-33.

239

See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 17, at 343.

2JJ

234

See id.

235

Plaas, supra note 213, at 127.

See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 17, at 342, n. 81 (relying on
Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 109 S. Ct. 278, 281 n.6
(1988), quoting NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2nd Cir.
1941».

236
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See Scalia, Common-law Courts, supra note 119, at 34.
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240 See generally Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on
the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning,
73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (I 998)(examining the factors that influence
judges to decide cases the way they do); see also Plaas, supra
note 213, at 128-130. Professor Plaas correctly notes the Supreme
Court's ideological make-up as to the division between "liberal,"
"moderate," and "conservative" justices. He points out that, "to
the extent that a Justice is controlled by precast views, the
likelihood of truly objective decision-making is reduced to an
illusion." !d.

See id. (arguing that Justice Scalia's opinion is motivated by
his conservative politics).

241

See generally id. (discussing generally Justice Scalia's
inconsistencies in applying the textualist methods; what Professor
Plaas calls "textualist malpractice").

242
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obvious in civil-rights and environmental-law cases,
especially cases that affect disadvantaged litigants. 243 An
example of this point is his opinion in Independent Fed'n
of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, where the meaning of §
706(k) of Title VII was in contest. 244
The issue in Zipes was whether the plaintiffs could
recover attorney's fees from losing intervenors. 245 Section
706(k) provided that "a court, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fees as
part of the costS."246 One would expect this text to be
plain to Justice Scalia. This time, however, Justice Scalia
deviated from his textualist tradition, and was quick to
find ambiguity in the text. 247 Hence, uncharacteristically,
he not only looked to such extrinsic evidence as the
American legal position that winners are not entitled to
fees from losers,248 but also relied on legislative history.249
He held that plaintiffs could not recover attorney's fees
under his reading of § 706(k), "in light of the competing
equities that Congress normally takes into account," and
since his reading furthered "congressional policy in favor
of 'vigorous ' adversary proceedings. "250 To the proponent
oflegislative history in statutory construction, this sounds
awfully familiar.

Another striking example of where Justice Scalia
uncharacteristically deviated from his textualist approach
is Lukhard v. Reed. 251 The Court in Lukhard decided
the issue of whether, pursuant to the Aids to Families with
Dependent Children Act (AFDC),252 a personal injury
award was "income" or "resources," for the purpose of
assessing eligibility for benefits under the Act.253 The word
"income" ordinarily connotes gain or profit. 254 A personal
injury award is not commonly understood as a gain or a
profit but a financial attempt to put the plaintiff in his or her
original position.255. Yet Justice Scalia ignored the
dictionary and common usage (textual devices), and,
instead, opted for legislative intent. 256 He couched this
reliance on legislative intent in textual terms, holding that,
because other statutes excluded personal injury awards
from income, congressional silence as to the AFDC statute
showed Congress's intent to include such awards in an
applicant's income pool.257 He also relied on postenactment statements ofthose involved in passing the
statute. 258

251

481 U.S. 368 (1987).

252

See 42 U.S.C §§ 601-615 (1988).

243 See id.

253

See Lukhard, 481 U.S. at373.

244

254 The respondents refen'ed to the dictionary, a resource which
Justice Scalia frequently uses in his textualist approach. See id. at
375.

491 U.S. 754 (1989). See Plaas, supra note213, at III, for an
excellent discussion of Justice Scalia's opinion in Zipes.
245

Zipes, 491 U.S. at 755.
To be sure, personal injury awards are not "income" for tax
purposes. See 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2)( 1999& Supp.). Seegenera/ly
John E. Theuman, Annotation, Propriety o/Taking Income Tax
Into Consideration in Fixing Damages in Personal Injury or
Death Action, 16 A.L.R.4th 589 (1982).
255

246 See id. (quoting 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(k) (1988» (emphasis added).

Justice Scalia had, in other cases, found "plain" texts that were
muddier than § 706(k). See Rabbit, where Justice Scalia found
that ESA' s language was plain even when "harm" was not defined
in the act, and was subject to several meanings. Additionally, he
had on at least one occasion stated that Title VII was "a model of
statutory draftsmanship." See Johnson v. Transportation Agency,
480 U.S. 616, 657 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Title
VII is so clear as to be against affirmative action).
247

248 See Zipes, 491 U.S. at 758.
249 See id. at 761.
250Id. at 761-766.

256 See Lukhard, 481 U.S. at 376.

As Professor Plaas notes, "he allowed congressional silence
to trump text, common usage and similar schemes." Plaas, supra
note 213, at I 19. The respondents in Lukhard had, among other
definitions, utilized the IRC's definition of"income" in 26 U.S.C. §
104(a)(1988). See Lukhard, 481 U.S. at 376.

257

258 See Lukhard, 481 U.S. at 378. In his discussion of Lukhard,
Professor Plaas correctly notes that Justice Scalia had, in another
case, rejected the type of post-enactment statements he relied on
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Apart from the two cases above, Professor Plaas
lists at least four other cases in which Justice Scalia's
deviation from textualism is so flagrant that his decisions
are irreconcilable. 259 These decisions expose the fact that
Justice Scalia's textual ism may be motivated by other
considerations than consistency, predictability and judicial
restraint. His socio-political ideology is a logical suspect.
This is supported by the fact that even when he agrees
with the so-called liberal Justices, he goes out of his way
to distance his opinions from theirs by hiding under different
issues. In California Federal Savings & Loan Ass 'n v.
Guerra,260 for example, the issue was whether California
law providing special protections for pregnant female
employees discriminated against men, pursuant to Title VII,
which prohibits employment discrimination based on
sex. 261 Justice Scalia, even while agreeing with Justice
Marshall in answering this question in the negative,
contended that the Court should have limited its analysis
to the preemption issue also raised in the case. 262 This is
a suspicious reasoning because preemption was not really

in Lukhard. See Plaas, supra note 213, at 119 (referring to Pittston
Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105 (1988), where Justice Scalia,
at 118-19, said: "[s]ince such statements cannot possibly have
informed the vote ofthe legislators who earlier enacted the law,
there is no more basis for considering them than there is to conduct
post-enactment polls of the original legislators").
259

See Plaas, supra note 213, at 112-121.

260

479 U.S. 272 (1986).

261

See id. at 274. Title VII states:
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin ... (emphasis added).

See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 (1994).
262

See id. at 280.
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a strong contention in that case. 263 One may wonder if
Justice Scalia was trying to avoid sanctioning the ruling in
United Steel Workers ofAmerica v. Weber,264 a decision
that he had vigorously argued to be overturned. 265
For Justice Scalia, like those judges who seek to
hide their judicial politicking, textualism presents a
principled front. It offers a cherubic mask of judicial
neutrality. While judges who rely on a statute's text appear
detached from politics, those who use legislative history
are more likely to expose their political biases. The
textualists appear consistent and neutral because an opinion
couched in textual tenns very effectively masks the writer's
underlining ideological biases.

v. CONTEXTUAL ACTIVISM
Brogan is a typical example of where dogged
adherence to statutory text leads to jurisprudential
absurdity. While a false exculpatory statement may seem
to fit in the text of § 1001, the majority's literal interpretation
is judicial passivity, ifnot jurisprudential zombism, far from
the common sense of justice. 266 As Justice Stevens
correctly noted, even though § 1001 can literally be read
to prohibit false statements by federal undercover agents
263

See id.

264

443 U.S. 193 (1979).

265 See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 1472 (Scalia, J., disenting) (criticizing
the Court's decision in Weber). Weber addressed a similar issue
to that in Guerra. The issue in Weber was whether, under Title
VII, an employer's affirmative-action program (concerning
employee training and promotion) for black employees amounted
to discrimination against a white employee. See Weber, 443 U.S.
at 196. The Court answered this question in the negative, holding
that such a voluntary and temporary measure geared towards
correcting the historical discrimination against black employees,
even when race-conscious, was not prohibited by Title VII. See
id. at 208. At the time of Weber, Justice Scalia was not on the
Supreme Court, but upon joining the Court, he has been relentless
in arguing (as he did in Johnson) that Weber should be overruled.
For such a committed textualist, you would expect Justice Scalia
to consistently find the text of Title VII to be plain in its prohibition
of employment discrimination, whether based on sex or race.

266 Justice Scalia confuses "justice," which should always inform
judicial decisions, with "writ[ing] into our law [a] species of
compassion inflation." See Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 810.

Articles
to drug traffickers,267 it is not likely that the Court would
subscribe to such a construction. 268 Justice Stevens was
also correct when he observed that the majority's analysis
wrongfully deviated from a well-established principle that
counsels against applying a criminal statute where doing
so would lead to a broader result than Congress
intended. 269 Because it is not unquestionably obvious

Clearly, drug-trafficking is a matter within the jurisdiction of
the United states. See 21 U .S.C. § 841 (1998).

267

268 See Brogan, 118 S. Ct at 817 (Stevens, J, dissenting). The
Court in the situation described above is very likely to apply a
policy-driven "government-function" exception to exclude such
agent's statement from § 100 I. However, a Constitution-driven
"exculpatory no" exception is also consistent with public policy,
i.e., the right to be free from constructively or directly coerced
self-incrimination. Although Justice Scalia contends that "proper
invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination allows a witness to remain silent, but not to
swear falsely, "See Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 810 (quoting United
States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 117 (1980». Silence where that
right is not well understood is a canard. This is mainly so as the
Miranda instruction given defendant Brogan was materially
defective, even though Justice Scalia relies on "the modem age
of frequently dramatized 'Miranda' warnings" to conclude that
Brogan understood his rights. The agents told Brogan that "ifhe
wished to cooperate, he should have an attorney contact the U.S
Attorney's Office .... " Yet the agents proceeded to question
him. See Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 807.

See Brogan, 118 S. ct. at 817. Justice Stevens refers to the Rule
of Lenity. The Rule of Lenity is a substantive canon of statutory
interpretation that states that laws that are punitive in purpose
must be construed strictly. Thus, where a statute does not clearly
prohibit a conduct, the statute should not be applied to punish a
violator. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 209, at 655-56. Even
discarding legislative history, Justice Stevens's alternative
interpretation of § 100 I is consistent with the Rule of Lenity, a
canon of statutory interpretation with which textualists have no
qualms. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359 (1987)
("[W]hen there are two rational readings of a criminal statute,
one harsher than the other, we are to choose the harsher only
when Congress has spoken in clear and definite language.")
(emphasis added); see also Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380(1991)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[F]irst, find the ordinary meaning ofthe
language in its textual context; and second, using established
canons of construction, ask whether there is any clear indication
that some permissible meaning other than the ordinary one
applies.") (emphasis added). Although Justice Scalia frequently
avoids applying the Rule of Lenity, because he is quick to find
269

that § 1001 is intended to punish exculpatory statements,
since the text is subject to two permissible meanings,270
the rule oflenity should have been applied to construe the
statute in favor of the defendant, Brogan. Justice required
the Brogan Court to choose a restrictive, not Justice
Scalia's harsh, punitive construction, if indeed the idea is
to force Congress to clarify § 1001.271
Although justice does not call for the judicial
usurpation of legislative authority, statutory construction is
"something more than judicial passivity." 272 Textualism,
in fact, promotes the usurpation oflegislative authority.
At the very least, it promotes injustice. It overlooks the
fact that statutory construction is an art, not a science. 273
In the alternative, it suggests that such artistry should be
confined to grammatical creativity, devoid of historical
context. But one need not rely on the science ofetymology
to understand that the meaning of a word may depend on
the user's purpose in communicating. The meaning of a
legal text must not be detached from the "why," as well as

"plain" language, he assents to the rule where there is reasonable
doubt as to what a text conveys. See, e.g., Deal v. United States,
508 U.S. 129 (1993) (recognizing thatthe Rule of Lenity may apply
in certain situations, but finding no need to apply it to the
petitioner's situation because the word "conviction" in 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(l) is unambiguous).
270 See Chisom, 501 U.S. at 380. In fact, not only is there an
alternative permissible meaning of § 100 I, for more than forty
years, courts have read the provision to exclude mere denials of
wrongdoing. See supra Part IV.

271 See Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 810 ("The objectors' principal
grievance [as to the force of § 100 I] ... lies ... with Congress ..
.. "). In McNally, the court applied the Rule of Lenity and strictly
construed the mail fraud statute to exclude "depriving another of
the intangible right of honest service" from the statutory language
"scheme or artifice to defraud." See McNally, 483 U.S. at 330. The
Court, in an opinion joined by Justice Scal in, left it up to Congress
to clarify the statutory language. See id. Congress did so by
stating that" 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes scheme or
artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest
services." See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988). See generally Eskridge &
Frickey, supra note 209, at 674.

272

See Scalia, Common-law Courts, supra note 119, at 61.

273

See id. at 15.
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from the "how" or "what," of the text. A major flaw in
textualism is that it is one-sided. Its disregard for legislative
purpose exposes a gap in its foundational projection of
the separation-of-powers doctrine, and does not accord
it the constitutional legitimacy that its proponents so desire.
A. The Role ofthe Judge in an Era of Codes

As discussed earlier, the nineteenth-century surge to
codifY American law did not overthrow the common-law
system. Instead, the resultant code-system was to exist
alongside, if not employed to facilitate the common law.
Implicit in this idea is the recognition that law must not
exist in a vacuum but must be functionally viable to respoQd
to societal changes. This logic, which has long fueled the
role of the common-law judge - to apply and develop the
law in real circumstances - also projects the constitutional
role ofthe judge in American modem democracy. Even
with the separation-of-powers doctrine, the common-law
judge was notto become a juristic invalid, whose legitimate
posture in policing the majority could easily be thwarted
by the same majority. To the contrary, the judge's
constitutional role suggests a judicial activism that must be
guided by the constitutional duty ofprotectingjustice, not
frozen in the formal codification oflegislative enactment.
This role, however, does not permit the imposition of the
judge's will on the legislature. 274
The judge has to weigh the quest for justice against
the respect for legislative supremacy; this is what should
be understood as judicial activism. On the one hand, the
judge, in interpreting a statutory provision, must protect
justice and individual liberty by guarding against
jurisprudential absurdity. On the other hand, care must
be taken so that individual will and force may not override
the legislative expression of a legitimate majoritarian will.
This is the problem that the common-law judge faces.275
To solve this problem, the judge must begin with the
Constitution - the most potent acceptance of majoritarian

274

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).

m See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES

1-10(1982).
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rule by the minority, and the single best protection for the
minority.276 The judge must use the Constitution as a
judicial compass in finding and curtailingjurisprudential
absurdity. But, in a common-law system, the judge must
not stop with the Constitution. For, where the legislature
has enacted an unclear statute, "it is the province of the
courts to liquidate and fix [its] meaning and operation. "277
The Constitution, though the threshold ofliberty, does
not complete the quest for justice. The quest for justice is
intricately linked with the judicial ability to "liquidate" and
"fix" a bad law, not only to invalidate the law simply on
constitutional grounds. But, the judge also must perform
this duty without violating the Constitution, because "[i]t
can be of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretense
of repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure to the
constitutional intentions ofthe legislature. "278 The limit of
the judge's function in "liquidating" and "fixing" a
problematic statute is the issue one must address. Some
who engage injudicial passivity try to justifY such a choice
in terms ofjudicial restraint and passive virtues.279 The
basic contention is that the judge must not play too active
a role in interpreting a statute, as to rely on the political
origin ofthe statute in "liquidating" and "fixing" the statute's
meaning. To evaluate this argument, however, one must
not ignore the nature ofthe system within which the judge
must function. There are two questions that must be
addressed. First, what is a bad and an unjust law? Second,
how does the judge liquidate and fix such a law without
implicating individual will and force at the expense of
constitutional legitimacy? It is indeed the second question
that has been the source of much controversy in statutory
construction, and the main focus ofthis Article.
A bad and an unjust law, for purposes of
interpretation, is one that lacks clear and general
applicability. That type of law is one whose meaning is
not apparent from its text, or whose application defeats

276

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).

277

THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added).
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Jd.

See supra Parts III and IV. For an excellent presentation of the
arguments, see CALABRESI, supra note 275, at 1-10.

279
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its purpose because it results in absurdity. Such a law, if
criminal, promotes what I call a Type-l A Error - punishing
those whose conducts would not be proscribed by a
rational majority, but by the law's textual ambiguities. 28o
A law is also bad if it has outlived its usefulness; if its
enforcement absolutely makes no sense in present society
- it is an anachronistic law.281 Most bad laws, without
judicial intervention, result not only in the violation of
constitutionally stipulated rights but also in the denial of
fundamental justice, recognizing that justice is a function
of the times - a function of societal Zeitgeist. These bad
laws may be the products of inadequate draftsmanship,
or the consequences of a socio-culturallag. The latter is
what Judge Calabresi calls "the problem of legal
obsolescence," which he describes as "the combination
of the [law's] lack of fit and lack of current legislative
support."282 Both sources of bad laws are, nevertheless,
linked to the American codification movement discussed
earlier.
As already indicated, the American code-system is
not perfect. Although today's statutes may be more
detailed and better drafted than before,283 they still are
inadequate to require only a passive interpretation.
Because the codes are not elaborate in stating the legal
principles that must govern interpretation, they are ravaged
with gaps. These gaps defy juristic logic, as to oftentimes
require more than a textual construction. This is so
regardless of whether these gaps are due to sheer
inefficiency in drafting, as with the Internal Revenue Code,
or the unintended result oflegislative logistics, as in the
case of political compromises.

280 This error in judgment can be distinguished from Type-I and
Type-II errors. Type-I error is where the court concludes that a
conduct is illegal where it is not; Type-I I error is the conclusion
that a conduct is not illegal where it is. See Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Econometrics in the Courtroom, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1051
(1985); see also CURT R. BARTOL & ANNE M. BARTOL, LAW AND
PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH AND ApPLICATION 183-84 (2d ed. 1994).
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The American judge, therefore, is at a loss if required
to interpret these bad laws as the civil-law counterpart
would a civil code. 284 This is especially so where the laws
also suffer from Judge Calabresi's syndrome of legal
obsolescence, where "[c]hanged circumstances, or newer
statutory and common law developments, render[] some
statutes inconsistent with a new social or legal
topography. "285 In those situations, the judge is confronted
with a law that is so outdated as to make its application
irresponsible and unjust. A bad and unjust law, thus, is
one whose legislative purpose is undermined by gaps in
drafting and changes in social circumstances. What then
is ajudge to do, as the common-law tradition requires the
judge "to think of the law as functional, as responsive to
current needs and current majorities, and as abhorring
discriminations, special treatments, and inconsistencies not
required by current majorities?"286
Judge Calabresi is right in advocating a solution
through a judicial-legislative balance, with which the court's
role is "no more and no less than the critical task ofdeciding

See Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 225, 235 (1999)("[T]he kind of statute undergirding
the civilian attitude, the Code Civile, [for exampe], has
characteristics that support the more distinctly separated judicial
and legislative role characteristic of western European legal
systems"). As noted earlier, European codes:
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[E]merge in a single legislative act, after exquisite
intellectual consideration, as an integrated whole. They
are rarely if ever amended; and if amended, on Iy after
equivalent study and attention to the integrated effects
of change. A cohesive, comprehensive, enduring text,
not easily changed in any forum, the Code Civile, say
our Restatements - invites scholarly explication and
judicial modesty.
Id. This type of code hardly needs a rigorous examination of its
political history for a proper interpretation, because such history
is either evident in the text or can be gleaned without the help of
the legislature.
285

See G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW95 (1977), cited in
CALABRESI, supra note 275.

CALABRESI, supra note 275 at 6.

283

2861d.;

see also HELEN SILVING, SOURCES OF LAW 79-125 (1968).

30.2 U. Bait. L.F. 33

Articles
when a retentionist or a revisionist bias is appropriately
applied to an existing statutory or common law rule. "287
Although it may be tenuous to advocate Judge Calabresi' s
version of judicial activism,288 it is enough to note that
judicial activism in a bad-law situation must not violate the
judicial-legislative balance. Because a bad law is one which
undermines justice, "liquidating" and "fixing" such a law
involves ajudicious application of the law, not Justice
Scalia's textual imperialism over legislative will. The judge's
role, even in an era of codes, must go beyond textual
idolatry, to include the judicial safeguard ofjustice and
liberty for all.
By examining the law's history, thejudge aims at
"majoritarian"justice, and avoids the constitutional difficulty
of imposing independent will and force on legislative
intentions - Hamilton's hope.289 Moreover, where the
legislative intentions are oppressive and unresponsive to
current constitutional notions ofjustice and liberty, the law
, must be presumed unconstitutional. Notice that this
judicial-legislative balance does not translate into the
merger ofthe judiciary and the legislature, but into a dynamic
relationship that projects our cherished system of checks
and balances. 29o Indeed, the judiciary merges with the
legislature where the judge imposes an independent intent
without regards to legislative due process. The judge, by
not paying attention to legislative intent or purpose, but by
applying the law according to individual understanding and
will, becomes a default legislator. We must, therefore,
formulate any approach to statutory construction with the
above in mind.

287

B. Contextual Activism as a Practical-Reasoning
Alternative to Textualism
Judicial activism done within the context oflegislative
supremacy and legal pragmatism is what I call contextual
activism. The judge's job is to "judge." The art of
')udging" requires the employment ofthose techniques that
lead to a practical solution to any issue at stake. It should
not matter whether the judge uses legislative history, simply
looks at statutory amendments, or examines a text in
harmony with other provisions, so long as the focus is on
avoiding a nonsensical construction. The best approach
must consult any source that would shed light on an
ambiguous text. Where it is necessary, the judge should
fuse historical facts with textual aids. In other words, the
judge should engage in what Professors Eskridge and
Frickey call the "funnel of abstraction" or'''practical
reasoning" method.29I With such an approach, the judge
does not passively interpret a provision, but actively seeks
a just and constitutional result. The result is ')ust" because
it comports with what is already published as prohibited.
It is constitutional because it does not stray from a legitimate
legislative goal.
Statutory construction should include an
understanding and the use of a statute's background in
interpreting its text.292 While recognizing the primal nature
of statutory text, the interpreter should apply historical
factors to accentuate the textual language. The text, usually,
must be the starting point, whereby one considers a
problematic text in the context of the whole statutory
scheme.293 That statutory scheme, in turn, should be
understood by a look at the historical undertones of the
statute's enactment; generally, this should involve the
cautious use oflegislative history to discern the statute's
purpose.294 Where there are more than on~ possible
purpose, it is important to study them contemporaneously,
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and to see how they work together to give meaning to the
text. With a "smoking-gun" legislative history,295 ifnot
planted to derail the focus of the statute to where a loser
legislator or lobbyist wants it, the judge's job is dramatically
reduced. The judge should also examine those evolutive
factors as to understand how changed circumstances affect
the statutory meaning.
Instead of Professors Eskridge and Frickey's
emphasis on a hierarchical consideration ofthese contextual
factors,296 however, the contextually active judge focuses
more on the harmony among the relevant factors; apart
from the statutory text, no one factor is more important
than the other. Moreover, the level of inquiry into these
factors must not go as deep as to transform the context
into the law. Additionally, unlike what Professors Eskridge
and Frickey suggest in their practical-reasoning method,297
the contextual activist need not engage in Judge Posner's
imaginative reconstruction. Such imaginative reconstruction
permits the judge to impute an individual legislative
amateurism into the interpretive process. This is an attempt
at lawmaking, to which the textualist objection is
warranted. The relevant notion, instead, is to have a
sufficient background for understanding a text. There is
no need for a "psychic" reconstruction of defunct
congressional thought-process.
While one may find context in legislative records,
such records must be used with caution. A statutory
context must not overshadow the text. Legislative history,
while an appropriate context, is not the law. To overemphasize this history is to stand a chance oflosing sight
of the actual law that went through the enactment process.
Thus, contextual activism does not mean the unbounded
resort to legislative history. As it rejects the vacuous and
mindless dependence on text, so does it denounce the
irresponsible reliance on the scattered verses oflegislators.
Statutory interpretation, instead, is 'judging," an endeavor
that must be based on judicial sensibilities, and aim at legal
practicability.

C. The Maryland Approach as an Example of
Contextual Activism
It has been argued that there is no difference between
the Supreme Court and state courts in how they approach
the interpretation of statutes. 298 According to Judge Abner
J. Mikva and Professor Eric Lane, "approaches to
statutory interpretation are not divisible into 'state' and
'federal.' Differences in interpretative approaches are the
product of individual judicial sensibilities and not, for the
most part, particular jurisdictions."299 Along this line,
Professor Lane further contends that state courts are not
unique in their application of common-law techniques in
construing statutes. 300 In his views, federal courts, like
state courts, use the common law to fill the gaps in
statutes. 3ot Because judges, whether "federal" or "state,"
must "decide" cases, the common law is an inevitable
technique on both benches, not one restricted to the state
bench.302 Instead ofjurisdictional differences, factors that
determine whether a judge will impose his or her individual
will on a statute inel ude the statute's clarity, the intensity of
the individual will, and the judge's sense of responsibility
towards statutes in generaP03
The views above are partially right. While it may be
right that "individual judicial sensibilities" account for a large
part of a judicial decision, differences in the political
dynamics of the two jurisdictions may control such
sensibilities differently. Thus, the tune ofthe common-law
technique applied may derive from jurisdictional
sensibilities. In state courts, for example, the electoral or
republican nature of the relationship between courts and
citizens may require judges to employ a more pragmatic
approach to statutory interpretation. Thus, the state judge's
sense of responsibility towards a statute may be more
298
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judicious and less detached than found in a one-tracked
approach as in textualism. Because the politics of selecting
federal judges differ from that ofstate judges, the aggregate
make-up ofindividual judicial sensibilities may be different
for both benches. Moreover, judicial sensibilities derive
considerably from individual ideological or political
persuasions. Regardless of the reasons, there should be
no serious dispute over whether there are certain
differences between the Supreme Court and state courts
in their approaches to statutory construction. Take the
Court of Appeals of Maryland, for example.
Maryland's approach is a classic example of
contextual activism, far from the Supreme Court's
inconsistent homage to legislative context. Like several
state high courts, the Maryland Court of Appeals relies
primarily on the legislative context of a statute for the
meaning of its text. The focus is on avoiding an
interpretation that would lead to absurd results, because
such results could not have been the intent of the enacting
legislature. Judge Wilner's articulation of the Maryland
approach is an excellent description ofcontextual activism.
Thus:
[I]n construing a statute, [the] objective is to
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the
Legislature. Ifthe language of the statute is
clear and unambiguous and expresses a
meaning consistent with the statute's goals and
apparent purpose, our inquiry normally ends
with that language. If, on the other hand, the
language is susceptible to more than one meaning
and is therefore ambiguous, we consider not
only the literal or usual meaning of the words,
but their meaning and effect in light ofthe setting,
the objectives and purpose of the enactment,
and, in those circumstances, in seeking to
ascertain legislative intent, we consider the
consequences resulting from one meaning
rather than another, and adopt that construction
which avoids an illogical or unreasonable result,
or one which is inconsistent with common
sense. 304
Chesapeake Charter, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County Board of
Educ., 358 Md. 129, 135,747 A.2d 625, 628 (2000)(citations omitted).

Maryland courts have variously relied on what they
call "the cardinal rule of statutory construction" - to
ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. This
cardinal rule, I argue, does not usually operate beyond
what should be called "the papal rule of statutory
construction" - that courts must not effectuate that
expression ofintent that is inconsistent with common sense,
or leads to absurd results. In performing this function,
cOlU1s must start with the text of a statute. Logically, where
the text is plain and unambiguous in its expression of the
legislative intent, there is no need to continue the inquiry.
The problem, however, is that the judge who ignores
context, or who is quick to fmd plain text, is at a high risk
of not effectuating the intent of the legislature. Such a
judge is one who also thinks that the intent of the law is
different from that of the legislature; a position that is
conducive for ')udicial freewheeling."
Although I have noted earlier that legislative intent
may be difficult to discern, the court can use the statute's
purpose as a basis for understanding such intent. In
ascertaining intent, the judge must note that the members
of a legislature are rational people, and, therefore, would
not intend an absurd result, but one that comports with
common sense. This is precisely what the Maryland high
court does with great consistency and efficiency.
Regardless of how recent Maryland began keeping
legislative record, the Maryland Court ofAppeals has done
well in tracing the legislative history of a statute, and in
discerning the intent of a particular provision. Certain
factors may account for this efficiency, and for the state
court's better use oflegislative context than done by the
Supreme Court. For one thing, as compared to Congress,
state legislatures are more unified in their goals and intent.
Although local constituencies in state legislatures may
approximate the diversity found in Congress, state
lawmakers, on the whole, seem to have fewer distracters
to confront. It is one tIring for Baltimore City to compete
for legislative attention against another Maryland COlUlty,
it is quite another for Maryland to go against states like
California, Texas and Florida in Congress. The members
of Congress simply have more diversified interests
competing for their attention. 305 Therefore, it may be more
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difficult to ascertain congressional intent than it is to
ascertain the intent of a state legislature. 306
Whatever may be the reason, Maryland courts have
consistently followed the rule stated by Judge Wilner in
Chesapeake Charter. The state high court seems to have
done this in all of the 163 cases that this author reviewed.
While the court emphasized certain aspects of the rule in
some cases, it never strayed from the rule in all of the
cases. In some cases, the court seemed to emphasize the
clarity of a text; and, in other situations, it dwelt on
legislative context. The logic of this differential emphasis
is precisely why courts cannot depend on anyone principle
of interpretation to attack a statutory problem. The issue
in a case must depend on the particular circumstance.
While a statute may present a problem of serious textual
an1biguity, another statute may implicate such absurdity
questions as to require a reliance on legislative history.
Either way, the focus must remain on discerning and
effectuating that legislative intent that is consistent with the
particular circumstances. The Court of Appeals of
Maryland reiterated this approach in Sacchet v. Elan. 307
The issue in Elan was whether "manslaughter by
automobile" should be classified as a "crin1e of violence,"
for the purpose of determining the rate to be applied in
calculating an inmate's good-conduct credits.308 Section
700 (d) of Article 27 of the Matyland Annotated Code is
the statutory authority under which the Division of
Correction ("D.O.C.") awards good-conduct credits to
an inmate, which generally results in an earlier release of
the inmate. 309 In calculating these credits, this section
differentiates between crimes of violence and other
crimes.3iO While those convicted of violent crimes are
awarded credits at a rate of five days per month, other

convicts receive ten days per month. 311 In Elan, the
defendant was convicted ofmanslaughter by automobile. 312
The question, therefore, was whether this crime was a
crime of violence, as to deserve five, instead often, days
per month in good-conduct credits.313 Section 643B(a)
of Article 27 lists which crin1es are considered crimes of
violence. 314 Under this section, manslaughter, except
involuntary manslaughter, is a crime of violence.315
However, there is no indication as to whether manslaughter
by automobile is such a crin1e,316 since this crin1e is different
from those enumerated in Section 64 3B(a) in that it does
not require proof of intent but simply proof of gross
negligence. 317
The parties' arguments derived considerably from
their search for legislative intent in the textual amendments
to Section 643B(a).318 In the State's views, the legislative
intent of this section, as it concerns automobile
manslaughter, is evident in the phrase "manslaughter, except
involuntary manslaughter. "319 By this phrase, according
to the State, the General Assembly intended to categorize
as crimes of violence all forms of manslaughter except
common-law involuntary manslaughter.31o This conclusion
was warranted, the State contended, because if the
legislature had meant to include only common-law
voluntary manslaughter, it could have specifically done so
by using a different phrase from "manslaughter, except
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involuntary manslaughter."32I The inmate, Blan, argued,
in contrast, that this phrase actually expressed the
legislature's intent to focus on only the two common-law
forms of manslaughter - voluntary and involuntary
manslaughter. 322 Otherwise, the legislature would have
expressly mentioned manslaughter by automobile,
especially having amended other phrases in the same
subsection, with a view to clarifying the list of crimes of
violence. 323
The court of special appeals found Blan's argument
persuasive, basing its ruling upon the failure ofthe General
Assembly to amend the subsection as suggested, despite
the past opportunities. 324 The court of appeals, however,
went beyond this point, noting that the answer to the issue
did not lie in either "any supposed plain meaning of the
phrase 'manslaughter, except involuntary manslaughter' .
.. [or] in any purported inaction with respect to the same
language by successive Legislatures."325 This is because
each of these two factors is amenable to different, but
equally, plausible interpretations, "if all we look to is the
single, contested phrase as if in a vacuum. "326 Therefore,
"viewing statutory language in isolation is a method of
construction which this Court eschews."327 Instead, the
court would "examine the language of the statute in the
context in which it was adopted, and consider the general
purpose, aim, or policy behind the statute. "328 In other
words, the court would apply practical reasoning in looking
beyond the text of a statute, especially with a view to

understanding such text within the context oflegislative
intent and purpose, instead of finding that intent and
purpose in the unclear text.
The court, upon rejecting the parties' overemphasis
on the statutory text, began addressing the issue by
examining the nature of the crimes categorized as crimes
of violence under Section 643B(a).329 One distinguishing
factor between those crimes and automobile manslaughter,
the court noted, is that, unlike the former which required
proof of criminal intent, the latter required only proof of
gross negligence. 330 The latter, in fact, is an offense
committed while the offender is doing a lawful thing in an
unlawful manner, compared to the crimes listed in Section
643B(a), which are culpable acts in themselves.331 The
only crime mentioned in this section that does not require
criminal intent, the court continued, is involuntary
manslaughter, which is expressly excluded from crimes of
violence. 332 The court found it anomalous, therefore, that
the legislature would include a crime that does not require
criminal intent in the same category as those reqUiring intent
as all crimes of violence, and, at the same time, except
another crime - involuntary manslaughter- that also does
not require intent. 333 TillS anomaly it found to negate "the
prerogati ve and practice ... to avoid interpretation of a
statute that effects an unreasonable or illogical result or
one that is inconsistent with common sense."334
The court next looked at the fact that Section 643B(a)
also includes as a crime of violence an attempt at
committing any ofthe listed offenses. 335 According to the
court, there is no such crime as attempted manslaughter
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by automobile, because an attempt requires a criminal
intent, and involuntary manslaughter only requires that the
offender be grossly negligent in operating an automobile. 336
In the court's view, therefore, inclusion of this crime in the
violent category would amount to recognizing a nonoffense as in attempted manslaughter by automobile. 337
Such absurdity the court was not willing to support. To
buttress its point, the court referred to the history of the
statute. 338 It noted that at the time the legislature enacted
Section 643B, Section 388 (dealing with automobile
manslaughter) was already in force. 339 In fact, it was then
a misdemeanor, which carried a three-year maximum
sentence. 340 At this same time, meanwhile, involuntary
manslaughter carried a ten-year sentence. 341 It would not,
as such, make any sense that the legislature intended to
treat automobile manslaughter more harshly than
involuntary manslaughter. 342 For the foregoing reasons,
the court concluded that automobile manslaughter is not a
crime ofviolence. 343
The beauty of the court's approach in Blan is its
practical reasoning, far from the vacuous manipulation of
an unclear text. The aim is at a sensible execution ofa
legislative intent, an intent that is better understood within
the context of the statute's enactment. While the court in
Elan did not need to rely on such legislative records as
committee reports and floor statements, its extrication of
the statute's legislative intent revolved around the practical
application of the provision in question. The court was
not sheepish in its examination ofthe text. Even with such
a whole-act approach, the primary focus was not

))6

See id. at 97, 724 A.2d at 671.

337

See id., 724 A .2d at 671-72.

338

See id.

339

See id., 724 A.2d at 672.

340

See id.

341

See id.

342

See id. at 97-98,724 A.2d at 672.

343

See id. at 98,724 A.2d at 673.

necessarily on how the legislature used the unclear text in
other parts of the statute, but on the consistency and
uniformity ofthe legislature's enacting goals. This approach
is a middle ground between the hardened prisoner of texts
and the untamed addict to legislative history. Where a
textualist would necessarily end the inquiry with the phrase
"manslaughter, except involuntary manslaughter," and the
legislative historian would readily find solace in committee
reports, the contextual interpreter focuses mainly on
avoiding that interpretation that leads to an unreasonable
or absurd result. This, as indicated earlier, should be the
foundation upon which the court's activism must rest. To
be sure, the mere examination of the overall nature of a
statute is not enough to excuse a court from judicial
passivity .344 The court must choose that interpretation that
comports with common sense and justice. Unlike Justice
Scalia's textualist approach, and his result-oriented
utilization of the whole-act rule, the Mary land high court
would not hesitate to employ any means that would render
an intelligible and a practicable result. This is contextual
activism.

VI. CONCLUSION
Statutory construction is an art - a judicial art. It
requires judges to interpret the words ofothers - the words
of politicians, or at least of those who work for politicians.
These words are sometimes not clear even to the most
studious interpreter. Although statutes are deliberate legal
documents, they are also political products, often with holes
left by the enacting legislatures' inability to address every
related concern in the statutes. As such, they are bound
to contain unclear language. In a system where statutes
are primarily recitations oflegislative responses to practical
problems, and those responses are molded by logistical
compromises by legislators, it is not surprising that courts
would commonly encounter ambiguous statutory

See generally Brogan, 118 S. Ct. 805 (1998)( examining the
general nature of 18 U .S.C. § 1001, but reaching a passive and an
absurd result). Note that while the approach to Section 643B(a) of
the Maryland Code avoided the denial of a statutorily granted
right, Brogan's vacuous interpretation of § 1001 demeaned the
constitutional right to due process.
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provisions. In interpreting these provisions, the ultimate
goal should indeed be the avoidance of a meaning that
leads to absurdity. The objective is to abide by the
constitutional doctrine of separating the judiciary from the
legislature. This objective is hard to achieve without one
branch understanding what, why and how the other carries
out its functions.
The idea that statutory construction should be confined
to a statute's text is shortsighted and inadequate for what
is required in a democratic system that draws a lot from
the common law. Although statutes are supreme in today' s
constitutional democracy, they do not exist in a vacuum.
They are created within the political context ofthe problems
they address; they express well-debated public policies.
When the statutory interpreter goes outside this debate,
there is an increased chance that she creates a different
debate, which eventually results in tackling the wrong
problem (or the right problem with the wrong approach).
Justice Scalia's textualist approach to statutory
construction is faulty on many grounds. The main problem
is that it marginalizes the importance ofcontext, and ignores
the fact that this context is crucial to justice. Even when it
relies on context, it chooses the wrong one. Its criticism
of purposivism and intentional ism as relying on legislative
history and falling into the trap of'judicial freewheeling" is
myopic. To the contrary, textualism presents a more
serious danger of'judicial freewheeling," because when a
judge uses devices that are alien to a statute's creation,
there is a high likelihood that judicial opinions will become
result-oriented. Justice Scalia's own practices buttresses
this point, especially as they show that his textual ism is a
convenient tool for conserving and masking his political
ideology.
The best approach to statutory construction is that
employed by several state courts - what I have referred
to as contextual activism. Because statutes tackle practical
problems, they must be interpreted with a practicalreasoning approach. The issue is not whether the judge
must consult legislative history, but whether this history
can furnish sufficient context to the statutory text so that
the judge's interpretation would not lead to an absurd
result. While legislative records are not authoritative
sources of law, their cautious use presents a complete
picture. This approach is necessary in light ofthe American
common-law tradition, the skeletal nature of American
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codes, and the constitutional primacy of respecting the
legislature's authority. Moreover, law, in a democracy,
must not maintain an independent existence, but must live
or die by its purpose.
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